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INTRODUCTION
Islamic law constitutes the bedrock of Muslim belief. Few
Muslims over history have challenged it. But in the twentieth
century it appears that the bedrock may be shifting, as Muslims
have begun a reexamination of their faith. It is hard to gauge
how deeply the reexamination has penetrated the great body of
believers. At the least, it can be said that this reexamination is
having a major impact on the intellectual class, where social
change normally begins.'
Today's Muslims, living in the shadow of the Prophet,** are the heirs
to an astounding religious and political legacy; however, they have inher-
ited a world far different from their predecessors. Muslims face a
profound question: Do they wish to carry an onerous part of their in-
credible legacy forward to the present, and, if so, in what form will they
carry it-preserved in its pristine state or altered to meet new and unex-
pected challenges? This legacy is none other than the subject of Islamic
law, and the questions that this Note asks have begun to be posed to be-
lievers.2 The answers that Muslims give will determine the law's fate.
Classical Islamic law has three possible paths. First, it can be re-
garded as antiquated, and therefore dismissed in favor of more
"modern," Western approaches to the law. Second, the classical legal
tradition "could be" revived to reap the tenets of a "proven" system
and profit from previous religious validity. Third, present laws and insti-
tutions can be reformed to achieve religious validity by invigorating not
only the basic principles that make up the law, but also by emphasizing
tolerance within the law. Anyone with even a semblance of understand-
ing will immediately agree that the first option presents no option for the
overwhelming majority of modern-day Muslims, thus, leaving only two
options for a them to consider.3
While today's Muslims maintain perhaps an even greater desire for
faith to be integrated into their lives, they do not want integration to de-
prive them of their very humanity. The word that defines this religious
desire, fundamentalism, is often a misused and abused term. Religious
fundamentalism is essentially an attempt to return to a religious past.
I. MILTON VIORST, IN THE SHADOW OF THE PROPHET: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL
OF ISLAM 9 (1998).
** Please note that in every reference regarding the Prophet Muhammad, I ask that
God's peace and blessings be upon him.
2. This Note is limited to Sunni Islamic law, although the points articulated could
apply to the Shi'a version of Islamic law as well.
3. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 156-63 (2d. ed. 2001).
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Part of any Muslim's effort to return to their religious past usually in-
volves an invocation of Islamic law, or what has been termed the
Shari'ah. This Note intends t6 cursorily examine Islamic law-where it
was, and where it is going. More specifically, this Note will examine a
growing fracture within the Islamic community and how a fissure among
so-called fundamentalists will ultimately influence an understanding of
Islamic law.
In Part 1, the Note will briefly examine the need for "law" in the
Islamic mindset and how forthright analysis needs to extend beyond past
political and religious prejudices. Part II will then review the
characteristics of classical Islamic law. Through an examination of both
the source-constructs and the source-intonated methodologies, it will
dispel the impression that Islamic law is intrinsically static or rigid. Part
III will discuss the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism and the
fissure that is becoming evident between two major groups: Revivalists
and Reformists. Part IV will examine a fissure between contemporary
Revivalists, whose shortsightedness threatens to empty the Islamic legal
tradition of its tolerance and diversity, and contemporary Reformists,
whose constructs, although often grounded in Islamic principles,
articulate novel, but perhaps less religiously salient, ideas.
Part V then details a Reformist response to the Revivalist challenge.
Specifically, this Part will analyze how reform-aimed, classically edu-
cated Muslims could religiously account for modernity's more obstinate
hurdles. This analysis will focus on those institutions either not found in
the classical tradition, or in some ways antithetical to that tradition-the
modern nation-state and international law. Part VI will also examine how
fundamentalism's insistence on the need for Islamic law must yield to
the tenets of international law in the realm of women's rights. This Note
observes that there is a possibility for Islamic States to generate religious
viewpoints that express the spirit, rather than the letter, of classical Is-
lamic law. Particular attention will be paid to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
and the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, and how, by either
reactive or proactive stances, Muslim legal scholars have begun to chart
a course allowing them to ease into modernity with their classical legal
legacy intact. The Note concludes by urging that ultimate success will
only come when those most affected by the law participate to a greater
extent than they have in the past.
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I. THE PERSISTENCE OF LAW
Islam is part of more than one billion people's lives. Its legacy spans
more than fourteen centuries, and today Islam is the fastest growing re-
ligion on Earth.4 The Islamic faith has contributed to a multiplicity of
cultures, languages, and peoples, and has taken part in every major hu-
man endeavor, from anatomy to philosophy. For all of its varieties, one
characteristic shared by all followers of the Islamic creed is an adherence
to a divinely inspired law-an Islamic law, the Shari'ah'
Modern-day Muslims can be compared to the Greek god Janis, ma-
neuvering through the present and future by guidance often locked in the
past. The common reservoir of such guidance is typically what Muslims
considered the Word of God, or the Qur'an, and the example bestowed
upon them by God's vicegerent on Earth, the Prophet Muhammad.
The exalted place of law in Islam may be seen to follow from
the Islamic conception of God. He is Omnipotent, Transcendent,
and Unknowable in his nature; however, He has revealed His
will to us. This was nothing He had to do. He could have created
us, then left us in the dark, but no, by pure grace and generosity,
6He let us know how we should behave to please Him.
For centuries, while Islam made its political and religious ascent to
become one of the world's greatest empires, scholars debated, struggled
and philosophized over what they believed to be God's law. Despite be-
ing given both direct, Divine guidance and a divinely inspired exemplar,
Muslims soon found that discovering God's precise law was indeed a
difficult task.
Of course, before one begins even a rudimentary understanding of
Islamic law, one is bound to ask, "What is Islamic law?" Thus, it is only
appropriate to briefly consider the almost existential nomenclature em-
4. See FREDERICK MATHEWSON DENNY, AN INTROI)UCTION TO ISLAM 332 (2d ed.
1994); see also Douglas Jehl, Moderate Muslims Fear Their Message Is Being Ignored, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at BI.
5. See AHMAD HASAN, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 7 (4th
ed. 1988). The word Shari'ah and the cautionary principles are derived directly from the
Qur'an. "We have set you on the right path [Shari'ah]. Follow it and, do not yield to the de-
sires of ignorant men." THE KORAN 45:18 (N.J. Dawood trans., Penguin Books 12th ed. 2000)
(1956). The Arabic word Shari'ah is a noun derived from the verb "shari'ah," which means to
set the path or road that provides access to a source. See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Qur'an,
Shari'a and Human Rights: Foundations, Deficiencies, Prospects, in THE ETHICS OF WORLD
RELIGIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 63 (Koung Moltmann ed., 1990). The term may also be in-
terpreted as "a way of life" or "a method." Over time it has come to mean "divinely ordained
way of life." It includes legal and jurisprudential matters, as well as rituals, theology, ethics,
personal hygiene and good manners. See id.
6. Christopher Melchert, Islamic Law, 23 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 901, 901-02 (1998).
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ployed by the Islamic faith.' The word "Islamic" is an obvious adjective
for the religion of the Prophet Muhammad. Even more subtly, it is im-
portant to consider how an adjective like "Islamic" has a transformative
effect on the word law, which is already a subject bound by intrinsic and
authoritarian weight. Without having any awareness of its particulars, the
combination of both "Islamic" and "law" should invoke both enthusiasm
and reluctance, especially when human beings are asked to interpret
Divine law. Thus, in the case of those fallible creatures who claim to
possess the authority to alter its path, the denomination of a normative
subject by a religious distinction should naturally instill caution. In es-
sence, the Shari'ah is God's law to humanity. It is by its very nature
purely idealistic, and even though much of the following discussion will
use term the term Islamic law as if it were an evident promulgation of
rules, no one should believe the following is, in fact, the pure Shari'ah.
Most of the following discussion will focus on the Shari'ah's fiqh, or
jurisprudence, that is commonly regarded as a human attempt to grasp at
the Divine, but readily termed Islamic law.
At the outset, much like the English Common Law and the Roman
Civil Law, Islamic law should be properly regarded as a corpus, or a
paradigmatic system of law, rich in history and debate. In contradistinction
with its more worldly counterparts, however, Islamic law is grounded in
more than a nascent notion of idealism. Through a uniquely religious
undertaking, the Shari'ah attempts to bring "the Kingdom of God" to
Earth.8 Islamic law is also unlike more familiar systems of law for the
simple fact that its benefits and burdens are not confined to the present
world. Rather than regulate present conduct, Islamic law focuses on how
conduct in day-to-day activities affects a person's fate in the afterlife.9
Thus, the scope of Islamic law is much wider, as it regulates humanity's
relationship not only with his neighbors and with the State, which is the
limit of most other legal systems, but also with its God and its own
conscience." Ritual practices, such as the daily prayers, almsgiving,
7. Islamic law has been aptly defined as "the epitome of the Islamic spirit, the most
typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the kernel of Islam itself." Joseph Schacht,
Pre-Islamic Background and Early Development of Jurisprudence, in LAW IN THE MIDDLE
EAST: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 28, 28 (Majid Khadduri & Herbert V.
Liebesny eds., 1955).
8. See Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Ideal and the Real in Islamic Low, in PERSPECTIVES
ON ISLAMIC LAW, JUSTICE, AND SOCIETY 15, 15-17 (R.S. Khare ed., 1999).
9. It should also be noted that Islamic law can be divided between regulations relating to
worship and ritual duties or "acts which honor God" (ibadaat), and regulations or "transactions"
of a juridical, political, or interpersonal nature (mu'aamalat). See SHORTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ISLAM 143 (H.A.R. Gibb & J.H. Kramers eds., 1953). This Note will only deal with latter cate-
gory.
10. David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public International Law:
Separate Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819, 825 (1993).
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fasting, and pilgrimage, are an integral part of Islamic law.
Consequently, Islamic law sees no need to distinguish between the
religious and the secular; between legal, ethical, and moral questions; or
between the public and private aspects of a Muslim's life." Unlike
secular legal systems that grow out of society and shift with changing
circumstances, Islamic law was imposed from above. Under Islamic law,
it is not society that molds the law, but the law that precedes and controls
society.2
For some of the reasons listed above and for reasons not discussed
here, Islamic law has been represented within Western scholarship as an
essentially defective legal system.'3 This critique is not a novel one, but
has merely taken on a new form.'4 The argument against the viability of
Islamic law has changed from a Western defense of colonialism during
the age of imperialism, to a contemporary claim involving human rights,
democracy, and pluralism.'5 Even more, the proposition suggests that
Islamic law is simply defective, while somehow Western legal traditions
are complete. This critique only shortsightedly imitates the present po-
litical relationship between the West and the Islamic world, ignoring a
legitimate study of Islamic law. Legal critiques, which are based on po-
litical relationships rather than a valid inquiry of the law, are necessarily
flawed, as they add an obstacle to a meaningful discourse. The West, in
particular, needs to take a full account of Islam by attempting to appreci-
ate Islam and its tenets. Western legal students and scholars should not
I1. "In Islam, law plays a greater role than it does in Western societies. Islamic law
governs the life of every Muslim in every way. Law and religion are one. The Koran serves as
the basic constitutional document and regulates all aspects of life, from the proper clothes to
be worn and food to be eaten, to specific penalties for certain crimes." Joseph L. Brand, Book
Review, 82 AM. J. INT'L. L. 431, 432 (1988) (reviewing MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC
CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE (1984)).
12. See Sachedina, supra note 8, at 15-17.
13. "The underlying assumption has always been that Islam-as a culture and not only
a religious creed-was primitive, underdeveloped, retrograde, at best stuck in the memory
hole of a medieval splendor out of which it could not disentangle itself." Shlomo Avineri, The
Return to Islam, in GLOBAL STUDIES: THE MIDDLE EAST 167-70 (1973). However, there is
some argument that the English Common Law may have some of its origins in Islamic law.
See generally John A. Makdisi, The Islamic Origins of the Common Law, 77 N.C. L. REV.
1635 (1999) (arguing that the Islamic legal system was far superior to the primitive legal sys-
tem of England before the birth of the common law; the action of debt, the assize of novel
disseisin, and trial by jury introduced mechanisms for a more rational, sophisticated legal
process that existed only in Islamic law at that time).
14. "A continuing problem is that when talking about religion, many people ignore the
transcendent and transforming aspects of religion and see religion as an agent that necessarily
retards change and development and is more prone to violence." John L. Esposito, The Future
of Islam, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 19, 24 (Summer 2001).
15. See infra Section III.A.
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underestimate the role of Islamic law in the world. 6 The events of
September 11 and the fallout from those heinous attacks signal a dra-
matic need for understanding between Islam and the West.
Although it is important to avoid opinions based on political preju-
dice, and despite the indubitable claim of Islamic law's continued
existence, it is equally important that scholars and followers be allowed
to critique a law that purports to speak the Divine Will. The need for
such critique at this time is especially crucial, as the global fundamental-
ist movement now underway threatens to undermine the dynamics and
diversity of classical Islamic law.' 7 In many ways, what is at stake is not
only the preservation of Islamic law, but how its future as a legal system
will reflect its diverse and complicated past.
We shall soon discover that, although nations and peoples are quick
to cite Islamic law as divinely inspired law, a review of its history and
the methods used reveal that this contention is far from accurate. Islamic
law is not an insular corpus of law, but rather a matrix of legality derived
from various sources and bound by religious idealism. In fact, much of
what makes up the compendium of Islamic law is varied, and often con-
flicting. A brief study of both the law's sources and the methods which
were instituted by preeminent jurists to proverbially find Divine law, re-
veals the indelible, intentional impression left by humanity.
II. A REVIEW OF CLASSICAL ISLAMIC LAW
A. The Foundation of Classical Islamic Law
Briefly, Islam literally means, "submitting to the will of God."'8 Al-
though Islam is thought to be an eternal religion-the same religion
professed by Jesus, Moses, Abraham, and Noah-Muhammad is gener-
ally considered to be its founder.'9 Muhammad was born in the year 570
C.E. in the city of Mecca, located in present-day Saudi Arabia. 0 The
16. See infra Appendix (detailing the legal systems of the various members of the Or-
ganization of the Islamic Conference).
17. Countries that have constitutionally incorporated the Shari'ah include Pakistan,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. Clark Benner Lombardi,
Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The Constitutionalization of the
Sharia in a Modern Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81, 82 n.4 (1998). In addition,
Iraq, Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, the Sudan, and Tunisia have incorporated Islamic tenets more
deeply into the public life of their countries, either voluntarily or involuntarily. ALBERT
HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES 453 (1992).
18. CAESAR E. FARAH, ISLAM: BELIEFS AND OBSERVANCES 192 (5th ed. 1994).
19. Id. For an in-depth biography of the Prophet, which neither includes effusive praise
of the Prophet common to most Muslim writers nor the banality of most Western biographers,
see generally KAREN ARMSTRONG, MUHAMMAD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE PROPHET (1993).
20. See CYRIL GLASS9, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 279 (1989).
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events of his early life remain a mystery. It is agreed, however, that
Muhammad, though born into the powerful Quraysh tribe of Mecca, was
orphaned at a young age.2' He became a skillful merchant and developed
a reputation for honesty that eventually led to his marriage with the wid-
owed noblewoman, Khadija.22
At the age of forty, while meditating outside Mecca, Muhammad re-
ceived a revelation from the archangel Gabriel, announcing that he was
the successor to previous prophets of God and tasked, once again, with
delivering monotheism to humanity.23 Over the coming decades, these
revelations, once compiled, would constitute the Qur'an. The Prophet
Muhammad's message was that God would judge all humans at the end
of time. Therefore, the faithful should submit themselves to God's will
and show their gratitude to God. The Prophet, empowered by the mes-
sage imparted to him, delivered more than ritual and belief; he delivered
a powerful social critique.
Like other prophets before him, Muhammad's message was both
feared and shunned by the powerful and entrenched interests of
the economic and political elite, who represented the social and
economic inequities of society which the Prophet censured. His
teachings included outright condemnation of false contracts,
usury, the neglect and exploitation of orphans and widows, the
suppression of the rights of the poor, and the neglect of the
downtrodden by the rich. Muhammad had come to shake up the
status quo in his world, and the radical nature of his message
24was clear.
Soon after the Prophet began to spread his message, he and his early
followers encountered hostility from local, idolatrous tribes.25 Although
the Prophet continued his preaching, he dispatched some of his followers
to be protected by an empathetic Christian king.26 In time, residents of
the neighboring city of Yathrib offered the Prophet sanctuary, protection,
21. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 19, at 65-67.
22. See GLASS', supra note 20, at 280.
23. See id. The message of the Prophet paralleled the message of the Hebrew prophets:
God is one. He is all-powerful and created of the universe. There is a judgment day and de-
voted followers would be rewarded in Paradise and if not, punished in Hell. See generally
PAUL HrTTI, THE ARABS: A SHORT HISTORY (1996). "We have revealed Our will to you, as We
revealed it to Noah and the prophets who came after him; as We revealed it to Abraham,
Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob and the Tribes, to Jesus, Job, Jonah, Aaron and Solomon, and to David
to whom We gave the Psalms. Of some apostles We have already told you, but there are others
of whom We have not yet spoken." THE KORAN, supra note 5, at 4:163.
24. Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of Women: An
Incomplete Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 311, 315 (1995).
25. See GLASSE, supra note 20, at 280-82.
26. See THE KORAN, supra note 5, at xi.
[Vol. 24:273
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and a ready group of faithful adherents. The Prophet, prompted by
increased hostility and a failed assassination attempt, accepted their offer
of help.27
The Prophet's migration from Mecca to the City of the Prophet, or
Medina, heralded the beginning of a full-fledged Muslim community, or
umma. The migration between Mecca and Medina would be known as
the hijirah, and mark the beginning of the Islamic calendar. Protected by
distance and an increasing number of followers, Islam prospered. 29 The
Prophet attempted to settle disputes with his idolatrous Meccan
neighbors, but often incurred their relentless onslaught. After failed
compromises, treaty arrangements, and skirmishes, the Prophet entered
Mecca with 10,000 troops to reclaim the Ka'bah, the "Temple of
Abraham and Ishmael" built for the worship of one God.3 ° Rather than
lay waste his longtime enemies, the Prophet granted them full amnesty.
He then cleansed the Ka'bah of its idols and rededicated it to the
worship of God.' Even in the aftermath of his triumph, the Prophet
continued to receive revelations until they were declared complete. The
Prophet Muhammad died in Medina in 632 C.E.3 2
Although much of the following discussion will expound upon Is-
lamic legal concepts, it is integral to understand that beliefs and ritual
practices are at the heart of Islamic law." Muslims must believe in the
one God, His absolute supremacy, the angels, the prophets, the holy
books-which include the primordial versions of the Torah, Psalms, and
Gospel-and the coming Day of Judgment.: 4 Muslims must manifest
their faith through specific conduct in what is known as the Five Pillars
of faith.35 First, Muslims are obligated to proclaim at least once during
their lifetime the creed (shahadah): "There is no deity but God and
Muhammad is His Prophet. 36 Most Muslims repeat it daily; in order to
perform the second pillar, prayer. If possible, a Muslim must pray five
times a day (salat), while orienting their body toward Mecca.37 Third,
27. See GLASSE, supra note 20, at 280-81; see also ANTHONY BLACK, THE HISTORY OF
ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM THE PROPHET TO THE PRESENT 9 (2001).
28. See GLASSY, supra note 20, at 156-57.
29. See id. at 266.
30. See id. at 283.
31. See THE KORAN, supra note 5, at 5:5 ("This day I have perfected your religion for
you. I have chosen Islam to be your faith.")
32. GLASSt, supra note 20, at 284.
33. SHORTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 9, at 404.
34. GLASS9, supra note 20, at 88.
35. Id. at 132.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Muslims must donate regularly to charity (zakat).38 Fourth, Muslims
must fast during the lunar month of Ramadan, the same month that
Muhammad received the first revelation of the Qur'an. Fifth, if economi-
cally and physically able, a Muslim must make at least one pilgrimage
(hajj) to Mecca to visit the Kab'ah.3 9
B. The Genesis of Islamic Law: The Ascent of the Schools of Law
After the Prophet's death, a series of rulers, or what were ostensibly
political successors to the Prophet, came to power.40 In the wake of the
Prophet's death and in spite of the end of revelation, these Rightly
Guided Caliphs (al-khulufa ar rashidun) attempted to maintain order by
adhering to religious rules laid down during the Prophet's life.4 Many of
these rules were created on an ad hoc basis42 and were essentially con-
sidered clumsy and unprincipled in light of the idealized rule of the
Prophet.43 While the Rightly Guided Caliphs tackled issues about the
form of religious conduct, they, like their successors, were also inter-
ested in propagating their religion. By the end of this "Golden era,"
Islam dominated a vast and ever-expanding empire.44
In response to the end of revelation, and in an effort to confine the
explosion of incongruous rules and religious practices, pious religious
scholars, grouped together in loose fraternities formally known as the
Schools of Law (madhab), emerged. It is important to note that religious
leaders (imams), not popular movements, inspired greater legal
proliferation.45 In turn, pious scholars donned the cloak of jurists and
began to debate whether the legal practice of the early Islamic empire
was properly implementing the religious ethos of Islam. In order to
resolve the incongruities which had plagued early approaches to
formulating the law, scholars began the task of "finding" a unifying
paradigm-a hermeneutic-to guide the Schools of Law so that, despite
their differences, the schools would be united in their efforts. 46 So
popular were such religious movements that a second generation of
caliphs who came to power in the mid-eighth century pledging to build a
38. This is a 2.5 percent charity tax on the income and property of middle- and upper-
class Muslims. Believers are urged to donate to the needy as they feel appropriate. Id. at 430-
31.
39. Id. at 132.
40. See BLACK, supra note 27, at 14-16.
41. See I MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 147-
48(1997).
42. See WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 7 (1999).
43. See HAMID ENAYAT, MODERN ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT 13 (1982).
44. See MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM IN THE WORLD 11, 37-38 (1984).




proper Islamic society, enthusiastically sponsored jurists and promoted
the validity of the Schools of Law.47 Additionally, and quite literally
decades after the Prophet's death, an unmatched Islamic legal theorist,
Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i emerged to take on the Herculean task of
mapping out an approach to "find" the law.48
Shafi'i aimed to eliminate legal and religious schisms by producing
a uniform theory (ftqh) of how to derive principles from the prolixity of
sacred guidance.49 Shafi'i's fundamental teaching was that true
knowledge of Islamic law could only be attained through a derivation of
divine revelation, found in the Qur'an and/or in the divinely inspired
traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith).0 Shafi'i's doctrines are
the principal focus of this study, as they possess what many scholars
argue is the mean of Islam's theological and legal underpinnings.
Shafi'i's major contribution to Islamic law and to Islam was an exacting
emphasis on the Prophet Muhammad as a source of law. In fact, Shafi'i
perpetuated the proposition that, since the Prophet Muhammad could be
viewed as God's ultimate delegate to humanity, it only stood to reason,
and to some degree was mandated by faith, that the Prophet's traditions
should guide proper Muslim behavior.s These propositions, both pious
and rational, became the foundation by which the rest of classical
Islamic law stood.52 It should be noted, however, although Shafi'i's
hermeneutic eventually became paradigmatic of classical Islamic law, it
did not go unchallenged by self-purported rationalists or strict-
constructionist conservatives.53
In particular, a group of rationalists known as the Mu'tazilites,
reputed for their "extreme" dependence on human thought, argued that
legal principles should be grounded in cogent rationality. 4 They argued
that believers, guided by a philosophical and religious study of the
Qur'an would rationalize a proper course of action.55 Orthodox
adherents, however, rejected this doctrine, arguing that the approach took
47. See id. at 160-73.
48. See HALLAQ, supra note 42, at 18.
49. See id. at 21-35.
50. See VIORST, supra note 1, at 162-67.
51. See THE KORAN, supra note 5, at 4:59, 33:53.
52. Historically speaking, it should be noted that traditionalists' and quasi-rationalist
Mu'tazilites' use of the Prophet's traditions to gauge proper Muslim conduct had far-reaching
political implications on the ruling dynasties at the time. See VIoRsT, supra note 1, at 160-62.
53. See id. at 162-73.
54. As the Mu'tazilites' theological stance invited troubling questions about the wisdom
of Islamic doctrine, the sect sought to avoid everything that might compromise or encroach
upon the oneness of God. Accordingly, the Mu'tazilites rejected the doctrine that the Qur'an
was uncreated and eternal, as this doctrine implied that something other than God existed
eternally, thus creating an eternal and irreconcilable "dualism." See id. at 160-62.
55. Id.
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little account of both the Prophet and the Qur'an and instead maximized
human interests at the expense of the Deity's. Although orthodox
adherents were likely consoled at their rejection of the Mu'tazilite
ideology, they would soon find themselves adopting essentially human
constructs as the Divine law.56 One effect of excluding the Mu'tazilite
position was that the law became confined not only to the literate, but
also to a cadre of male religious scholars. As will be shown, although the
consequence of this reality was not altogether negative, contemporaries
utilize the Mu'tazalite rejection as pretext for their own hostility to
democratically elected legislatures or any other accompanying political
concept that humanity, rather than God, could decide the proper course
of action. 7
The combination of both pious scholarship and an accepted structure
of interpretation produced the formal Schools of Law. An important
point for understanding classical Islamic law is the predominance of
skilled and educated jurists. The jurists' ultimate goal was to develop
the law by discovering the divine intent embodied in the sacred texts-
the Qur'an and the Prophet's tradition, or Sunnah.59 Classical era jurists
were essentially guardians of the original Shafi'i hermeneutic, and their
legitimacy rested largely on their quasi-independent status from the sur-
rounding political system.6" It was often assumed that a jurist's interests
were not confined to the State and its accompanying power structure.
Rather, their interests lay in the exigencies of life and the complexities of
faith. In order to best grapple with the complexities of faith, jurists often
armed themselves with an intense education, allowing them to fully un-
derstand competing legal concepts from the various Schools of Law. In
addition, it is important to note that, while jurists played a powerful role
in the development of Islamic law, they did not exclusively shape the
law. The law was often the product of a complex interplay between
56. See HALLAQ, supra note 42, at 32.
57. See, e.g., VIORsT, supra note 1, at 230, 261.
58. Joseph Schacht observed that jurists often went to the extreme in the formulation of
Islamic law. JOSEPH SCHACH'r, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 5, 209 (1982). But see
Wael Hallaq, The Logic of Legal Reasoning in Religious and Non-Religious Cultures: The
Case of Islamic Law and the Common Low, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79 (1985-86); Wael Hallaq,
Was the Gate of ljtihad Closed?, 16 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STuD. 3 (1984). See also Khaled
Abou El Fadl, Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minori-
ties from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries, I ISLAMIC L. & Soc'Y 141
(1994).
59. "If one speaks about the Sunnah or the hadith in the contemporary era, one is nec-
essarily speaking about a symbolic construct that obtains its meaning and normative power
from the juristic culture." KHALED ABOU EL FADL, SPEAKING IN GOD's NAME: ISLAMIC LAW,
AUTHORITY AND WOMEN 97 (2001).
60. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Place of Tolerance in Islam: On Reading the
Qur'an--and Misreading It, BOSTON REV. Dec.-Jan. 2001-2002, at 34.
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judges (qadis),6' juris-consults (muftis), and the State authority in general.62
The reasoning for this approach was that jurists were sometimes notorious
for their inability to relate to the exigencies of life that followers faced.63
The genesis of what was to become classical Islamic law is
encapsulated into two historical stages-the Formative Era and the Post-
Formative era. The Formative era was marked by the emergence of
"master" jurists (mujtahids), or what shall be called the "Principal
Thinkers," such as Abu Hanifa, Shafi'i, Malik, and Hanbal. These Principle
Thinkers derived the law directly from the sacred texts. 4 The Post-
Formative Era was marked by the firm implantation of the Schools of Law
that were named after the Imams who founded them-the Shafi'i, Hanafi,
Maliki, and Hanbali.6 ' These second generation jurists studied the Principal
Thinkers, while simultaneously organizing, preserving, and communicating
the law to members of the communities in which they lived.
Despite some accord among the Schools of Law, there was endless
disagreement. Jurists disagreed about the appropriate way to analyze the
main sources of the law and, in turn, competed against one another by
defining their differences and championing their own rules to get at the
Truth.66 Rather than devote unnecessary time to examining the
differences between the Schools of Law, it is more helpful to understand
the tools they used in formulating the classical approach. Through
in-depth analysis of the pillars of classical Islamic law, we discover the
61. For a fascinating discussion about how judicial decision making is a cultural
phenomenon and how the nature of judicial discretion is shaped by its surrounding cultural
context, see LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN
ISLAMIC SOCIETY (1990) (arguing that judicial discretion, even within the Islamic legal
context, should be understood neither as arbitrary and unknowable, nor as a threat to the
rule of law; instead, it should be viewed as an expression of the cultural principles and
categories of the larger society within which the judge works).
62. See MOHAMMED KHALID MASUD ET AL., ISLAMIC LEGAL INTERPRETATION 3
(1996).
63. "It is as if one joins a debate between mathematicians who speak in an inaccessi-
ble language and who are not interested in explaining the relevance of their discussions to
outsiders." Alan Watson & Khaled Abou el Fadl, Fox Hunting, Pheasant Shooting, and
Comparative Law, 48 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1, 30 (2000).
64. See GLASSFI, supra note 20, at 286.
65. The Hanafi school is prevalent in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Turkey and
includes more than one-third of all Muslims. The Maliki school is prevalent in Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, the Sudan, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The Shafi'i school is prevalent in South-
ern Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Pakistan, and Indonesia. The Hanbali school
is the official School of Law in Saudi Arabia and is influential in Pakistan, Syria, and Iraq.
See SUBHI RAJAB MAHMASSANI, FALSAFAT AL-TAHRI FI AL ISLAM [THE PHILOSOPHY OF
JURISPRUDENCE IN ISLAM] 19-39 (F. J. Ziadeh trans., 1961). For a discussion of the major
differences among the Islamic Schools of Law, see generally MOHAMMAD HAMEEDULLAH
KHAN, THE SCHOOLS OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1991).
66. See SHORTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 9, at 611-15. See generally
WAEL B. HALLAQ, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN CLASSICAL AND MEDIEVAL ISLAM (1995).
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lengths to which classical jurists went in trying to discover the law, and
how, through their process of discovery, they imposed the need to
maintain legal tolerance-a matter often forgotten in contemporary
discussions about Islam and Islamic law.
C. The Pillars of Classical Islamic Law
To repeat, Shafi'i's hermeneutic formed the basis of the classical
theory, the science of jurisprudence (usul alfiqh). By the early tenth cen-
tury, this science of jurisprudence, or fiqh, became crystallized.67
According to the accepted fiqh, there are four main sources to Islamic
law: the Qur'an, Sunnah, qiyas, and ijma. Islamic law's primary precepts
came from the Qur'an and from the Sunnah. The two remaining sources,
ijma (consensus of the community of jurists) and qiyas (reasoning by
analogy), are not expressly sanctioned sources of law, but rather rational-
ized methodologies that require both intense deliberation and religious
temperance. Consequently, this Note has deliberately categorized the
Qur'an and the Sunna as source-based constructs68 and qiyas and ijma as
source-intonated methodologies.69
1. The Ultimate Source: The Qur'an
The Qur'an is the primary source of Islamic law.0 It is considered
God's ultimate revelation to humanity;7' or what one author deemed, "the
central fact of the Islamic religious exiierience. ' '72 Muslims and non-
67. See Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia 75-76
(1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University); see also NORMAN CALDER, STUD-
IES IN EARLY MUSLIM JURISPRUDENCE 58 (1993).
68. This terminology is not intended to undermine the religious validity of these sources,
only to demonstrate the interrelatedness of the various sources, as they are best understood in the
larger framework of Islamic law generally. Such delineation is supported by the Prophet's state-
ment: "1 leave behind me two things, the Qur'an and my example, the SUNNAH and if you
follow these you will never go astray." Bismillah, The Prophet's Last Sermon, http://
www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/muhm-sermon'html. It should be noted that, in the Qur'an,
compilations of the hadith are known collectively as ln. See HALLAQ, supra note 42, at 22.
69. See I KAMALI, supra note 41, at 168, 197.
70. The Qur'an ("The Recital") is about the same length as the New Testament. In con-
trast to the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, the Qur'an issued from the Prophet
Muhammad, who recited what he heard from the Archangel Gabriel. Both the Jewish and the
Christian scriptures are collections of many books that were written down by a large number of
humans, and opinions differ as to their status as revelation. Even if one claims that the books of
the Bible were all revelations of God, they were revealed to different people who did not live at
the same time or in the same place. The Qur'an is divided into chapters of unequal length, each
of which is called a sura, a word that literally means "a fence, enclosure, or any part of a struc-
ture." The shortest of the suras has ten words. The longest sura, which is placed second in the
text, has 6,100 words. See GLASSf, supra note 20, at 228-32.
71. See I KAMALI, supra note 41, at 15.
72. EsPOSITO, supra note 3, at 3.
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Muslims alike appreciate the Qur'an's distinct style. "The style of
expression underlying the Qur'an is a curious blend of poetic rhymed
prose and a lyrical flow."73 For most Muslims, however, the Qur'an is
dedicated to reminding them of the theological absolutes in place for
both believers and non-believers:
The Koran contains laws for society and warnings of the end of
the world, descriptions, of judgment, of Heaven and Hell. There
are stories of Biblical figures, but often in a form surprisingly
different 'from that of the Hebrew Scriptures, as if the same
events were being witnessed from a different point of view. It
also contains stories of figures unknown to the Bible as passages
metaphysical and non-historic and non-descriptive, Sacred his-
tory is a secondary preoccupation; the subject of the Koran is
above all the Divine Nature and the means of salvation.
What no perusal of the Qur'an fails to yield, however, is that divine
morality is heavily intertwined with legality. Clearly any verse of the
Qur'an, no matter its designation, earns an autonomic reverence border-
ing on idolatry. The Qur'an's ambition for salvation and its reverence as
the very word of God animate the very concept of an Islamic law. Con-
sequently, a more detailed analysis of the Qur'an is a prerequisite for
further appraisal.
According to tradition and contemporary understanding, parts of the
Qur'an were revealed to reflect a situation or occasion during the
Prophet's life.75 The chapters, or suras, are classified by whether the
revelations occurred in Mecca or Medina. 6 When the Prophet died in
632 C.E., the whole of the Qur'an was committed to memory by devoted
followers,7' while smaller parts and pieces were written on skins, bones
and stones.78 After a series of- battles in which many of these followers
were killed, there was growing concern that the Qur'an's contents would
be lost. Abu Bakr, then caliph, ordered the Prophet's secretary, Zayd, to
construct the canonically written Qur'an.79 Some eighteen years later, the
73. FARAH, supra note 18, at 82.
74. GLASS9, supra note 20, at 229.
75. See the discussion in I KAMALI, supra note 41, at 39-40.
76. See GLASSE, supra note 20, at 229.
77. Although this might appear astonishing to a contemporary audience, it should not
be forgotten that during this time there was a great deal of emphasis placed on oral tradition.
See I KAMALI, supra note 41, at 17-18.
78. See id.
79. See GLASS9, supra note 20, at 230.
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text was certified as faithful Scripture and true to the revelation of the
Prophet.8"
Admittedly, during the era of revelation, there was no science of or-
dering Qur'anic verses in terms of their chronology, nor has it been made
apparent that verses always possess a link to the Prophet's life. Thus, the
codified text, the "Uthmanic text," has no system of order aside from
putting the longest suras before the shortest.8' Even scholars readily ac-
knowledge that the Qur'an is not chronologically ordered or annotated
by those who compiled it. Some scholars attribute the erratic shifts in the
present text to a lack of a scientific or sufficiently careful organization. 2
Since there are no authoritative or even sufficiently credible alternatives
to organizing the Qur'an, both scholar and jurist are left contemplating
the exact meaning of each verse."
Although dismissed by traditionalists as relatively insignificant,
without a precise chronology of revelation, classical jurists were often
left speculating on the precise meaning of a particular verse. The prob-
lem of chronology was especially great when jurists had to decide
whether a verse carried an imperative, whether that same verse abrogated
a verse that preceded it, or simply whether a verse dealt with allegorical
or mysterious allusion. Thus, without a composite science to order reve-
lation, classical scholars were left with an immense struggle to
reinstitute order in an otherwise faithful text. They tackled the task by
resorting to other sources that could give the Qur'an an even fuller
meaning. Consequently, Muslim jurists of the Formative era relied both
on their personal insights as well as their intrepidity to construct legal
arguments that supported their understanding of the text.
Despite the legalistic spirit of the Qur'an, it is not itself a legal text.
4
No more than eighty verses deal with strictly legal matters. While these
verses cover a wide variety of topics and introduce novel rules, their
80. See Alford T. Welch, Kuran, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 404 (H.A.R. Gibb et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1960).
81. See I KAMALI, supra note 41, at 343, 353.
82. See REUVEN FIRESTONE, JIHAD: THE ORIGIN OF HOLY WAR IN ISLAM 43 (1999).
83. There is new scholarship suggesting that claims that Uthmanic codification of the
Qur'an is the only available version may not be entirely true, and there may be other variants
of the Qur'an still in existence. See Toby Lester, What is the Koran?, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Jan. 1999, at 43-56; see also THE ORIGINS OF THE KORAN: CLASSIC ESSAYS ON ISLAM'S HOLY
BOOK (Ibn Warraq ed., 1998). The implications of these findings, whether conclusive or not,
could suggest that there is a remote chance for fundamental alterations of the fabric of Islamic
law. It seems likely that many faithful believers will ignore these archaeological developments
as either fabrications, or simply assert that, as the sources are already settled, there exists no
reason for new legal interpretation. Id.
84. If one could superficially compare the Qur'an with the Book of Leviticus, one
would be impressed with how little the Qur'an speaks about the absolute legality.
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general effect was to modify particular Arabian customary law.8" Most of
the early jurisprudence contained in the Qur'an centered on easily refer-
enced positions and included matters like taxes, property, and
86inheritance. Despite the legal conclusions one might draw from the
Qur'an, its silence, ambiguity, or even clarity was only the beginning of
the law. What remains for the legal mind is the fact that the Qur'an is
distinct among legal and religious texts in that it integrates legality with
the infallible word of God. Consequently, any legal progeny even re-
motely outside the Qur'an's direct ambit may also have to be tested by
another legal source.
2. The Sunnah of the Prophet
The Sunnah is the spoken and acted example of the Prophet
Muhammad.87 This devotion to the Prophet is not difficult to understand
given his role as the human medium of the Word of God. For Muslims,
although the Prophet Muhammad did not ascribe to himself any attrib-
utes of the Deity, he was renowned not only as God's final messenger,
but he was also considered the vicegerent of God-a father, a husband,
and a human par excellence.88 To obey the Prophet Muhammad was, by
its very definition, to obey God. 89 Thus, the Sunnah is in many ways the
necessary compliment to the Qur'an. While the Qur'an essentially lays
down the broad outlines of Islam, it is not entirely prescriptive. Instead,
the Sunnah does much of the heavy lifting with regard to Islamic dogma
and ritual practice. 90 Readers might be struck by the fact that, although
Islam maintains a strict adherence to monotheism, the Prophet's prac-
tices are essential to practicing Islam in a more ritualized sense.
Despite what appeared to be axiomatic sentiments for contemporary
Muslims, a full-scale search for what constituted the life and practices of
the Prophet did not begin in earnest until Shafi'i gave the search an im-
primatur of religious fidelity.91 Thus, for centuries, Muslims throughout
the growing empire collected and recorded the Prophet's traditions
85. See HALLAQ, supra note 42, at 10-11.
86. See Westbrook, supra note 10, at 827.
87. The Sunnah is divided into three parts: (I) al-sunnah al-gawliyh, the sayings and
statements of the Prophet; (2) al-sunnah al-filiyah, the deeds of the Prophet; and (3) al-sunnah
al-taqririyah, the Prophet's silence or tacit approval regarding deeds which had occurred with
his knowledge. GLASS9, supra note 20, at 381.
88. For Qur'anic validation of this point, see THE KORAN, supra note 5, at 62:2.
89. Cf. HALLAQ, su)ra note 42, at 3. There is no agreement on the number of verses
that constitute a legal principle or rule. Hallaq argues that there are over one hundred such
verses, but some scholars put the number at nearly five hundred. /d.
90. See I KAMALI, supra note 41, at 53, 62.
91. See VIORST, supra note 1, 163-65.
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(hadith).2 "Hadith may enunciate doctrine or provide a commentary to
it. They deal with the contents of the Koran, social and religious life, and
everyday conduct down to tying of sandals."93 In spite of pious attempts
at trying to gauge the precise life of the Prophet, both Western scholars
and Muslim jurists have rejected many hadith as fabrications.94 Some
hadith were fabricated to validate otherwise well intentioned, pious into-
nations about the Prophet;95 while others were created to religiously
legitimatize political antics by Muslim rulers.96 Literally more than half a
million hadith were recorded, but there was no agreed-upon litmus test,
ex ante, to determine the validity of a particular hadith. As such, scholars
were forced to verify a chain of transmission (isnad) ex post.9 The proc-
ess of authenticating hadith involved examining the narrators who
propagated a particular version of a tradition and scrutinizing the subject
matter in order to determine whether it was in conflict with the Qur'an. 98
To complicate matters, even if Muslims implicitly assented to the
notion that the Prophet manifested the quintessential believer in God,
and if they agreed that a particular hadith was authentic, it did not re-
solve the question of whether the practice should be emulated. For
example, if the Prophet consumed a particular fruit on a particular day, it
was not always clear whether that action constituted an imperative for
his followers, or even a recommendation. Plausibly, a tradition could
simply reflect the conduct of a person who normally enjoyed a particular
fruit on a given day in a given place. 99 Consequently, since the hadith
constantly suffered from questions about authenticity or even proper use,
jurists soon came to the conclusion that the Sunnah alone gave an in-
complete picture of the law.
92. Interestingly hadith are divided into two general categories: hadith qudsi and hadith
sharif. Hadith qudsi are those traditions where God is the speaker, while hadith sharif stand to
relate some method or archetypal position of the Prophet. GLASSt, supra note 20, at 141 ; see
also I KAMALI, supra note 41, at 46-47.
93. GLASSf, supra note 20, at 141.
94. See I KAMAIA, supra note 41, at 65-68. In addition, it should be noted that even
among the pious followers, the different versions of the hadith were not compiled until ap-
proximately the ninth century, when it was discovered that hadith works differed and that
many of the hadith collections were fabricated.
95. Believers are often tempted to attribute the fanciful to the Prophet. As lgnaz
Goldziher noted, "I have come to the conclusion that a true believer is never so ready to lie as
in matters of the hadith." IGNAZ GOLDZIHER, On the Development of the Hadith, in 2 MUSLIM
STUo. 17, 55 (1971).
96. In particular, forgeries were often attributed to deepening schisms between political
elites. See I KAMALI, supra note 41, at 65-66.
97. See id.
98. For a more illuminating discussion on the topic of validation and rigors by which
isnad are achieved, see id. at 68-82.
99. See id. at 51-57.
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Jurists, well aware of the difficulties that came with creating the
Sunnah, had before them a daunting challenge. Even if they could accept
a common biography of the Prophet, and they often did not, they also
had the equally daunting task of extending the traditions of Muhammad,
a person who lived an extraordinary life in secluded Arabia, to the eve-
ryday lives of Muslims, whether they lived in Damascus, Darussalam, or
Cordoba, while at the same time insisting that what they propounded, as
ordinary humans, was in fact the Divine law. The constant question
posed by any jurist was, "[H]ow can one know that a particular decision
in a world of confusion is right, is what God wills? ' °
3. Qiyas and Ijma as Methodologies
Since questions of morality and conduct confront a Muslim any-
where he or she lives, and as there are often endless challenges to
preconceived notions about the law, there is an implicit need to extend
the law to divergent experiences. In an effort to ground Muslims in an
appropriate religious orientation, scholars created the concepts of qiyas
and ijma. Qiyas is defined as reasoning based on analogy,0' while ijma is
defined as the consensus of qualified legal scholars of a given genera-
tion. '°2 Both methodologies were presumably derived from the reliable
and guided action of the individual persons and the community that has
lived in accordance with that revelation and tradition.
Qiyas was essentially a process of analogical deduction based on the
provisions laid down by the appropriate verse(s) in the Qur'an and/or a
corresponding matter within the Sunnah. Qiyas was created in response
to a growing need to resolve problems which were not explicitly
addressed in the Qur'an or the Sunnah. °3 However, because jurists faced
a multitude of questions about proper conduct and because they had to
deal with the practical limitations associated with both sources as
essentially "closed" canons,'" multiplied by the constraints of literary
formalism, they were essentially compelled to become linguistic
100. Westbrook, supra note 10, at 827.
101. See I KAMALI, supra note 41, at 197-99.
102. See id. at 169.
103. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Methodological Issues in Islamic Jurisprudence, II
ARAB L.Q. 3, 29 (1996) ("[I]jma" represents the single most important concept in the legal
theory of usul which offers the potential of making the whole of the legal theory pragmatic
and viable.")
104. Until codified, the Qur'an was part of an oral tradition, which essentially meant that
those reading from it could ostensibly shift its meaning through both tone and inflection. It
was the necessity of maintaining the text itself that overcame any desire to uphold the oral
tradition. See VIORST, supra note 1, at 84.
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scholars in order to appropriately scrutinize the very language that
constituted the Qur'an and the Sunnah.' 5
Since Divine and prophetic commands were expressed in language,
an appropriate, or even a valid, understanding of the sources required an
expert knowledge of the function of language as a lexical code and as a
system of signs. 0 6 Jurists sought to master this code in order to discover
the meaning of the sacred texts, which they regarded as being identical
with the intention of the Divine Author. 7 Jurists soon realized that
language is intrinsically oblique. Even the seemingly clear commands of
the Qur'an may be subject to multiple, but faithful interpretations.
Sunnaic texts were equally ambiguous, not merely for the fact that they
were texts of language, but because it was often difficult to determine
whether the anecdotes recorded about the Prophet were to be emulated
as a matter of law.
Thus, if one begins to contemplate the enormous lingual task before
jurists in simply discerning a proper textual account, the idea of analo-
gizing would seem almost impossible. To extend an understanding of the
texts beyond their historical significance required recognition, percep-
tion, and insight, as well as the formidable responsibility of professing
one's belief as essentially speaking in God's name. The emphasis of
qiyas is the identification of a common, Divine cause between an origi-
nal and a new case. Jurists did not consider law derived through qiyas as
new law. For all intents and purposes, analogy was, in fact, the product
of human rationality used to rule on novel matters.' 0 While critics ab-
sently charge that Islamic law lacks an appropriate amount of rationality,
they would likely be struck by the fact that, even in cases where Islamic
jurists engaged in rationalization, they were tempered by the recurring
presence of religion, and therefore prohibited from drawing wild and
unsupported conclusions.
When the texts explicitly state the ruling of a case, then there
should be no room for doubt whether or not it is God's intention.
However, when the texts provide only indications and signs, the
jurist then must attempt to find out the divine intention, although
105. See generally BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW (2001).
106. See id. at 151-58.
107. See id. at 329-501 (discussing topics like commands, implications, ambiguities, and
unqualified expression, one cannot help but be nearly overwhelmed at the complexity in-
volved).




there is no guarantee that the ruling he reaches will be identical
with that which is lodged in God's mind.0 9
Cognizant of the challenge that qiyas presented-an allocation for
jurists essentially to "create" the law-jurists were quick to subordinate
this source of law, but not to eliminate it. To conclude, not only did the
creation of the qiyas allow for religious recognition for rationality, it be-
came qiyas's hallmark."0
The Prophet once said, "My community will never agree on an er-
ror.""' In response to this highly-esteemed and ingenious sentiment,
jurists created the last well-regarded source of law: ijma. jma is a ra-
tionally derived, but permanent certification of religious authenticity
conducted by jurists within a given generation." 2 One might superficially
conclude that the proposition presented here suggests that the law can, at
some point, reach a vanishing point, an essential permanence. While this
conclusion is implicitly valid, it is also integral to note just how difficult
achieving such permanence really was.
Two major effects flow from the ijma doctrine. First, because the
rigors of religious certification are so difficult, they serve as permissive
principles by allowing varying opinions to be considered valid attempts
to define Islamic law. Second, by virtue of these certification problems,
ijma excludes propositions which have not been tested throughout the
community of believers. Put differently, the religious heights to which
one had to climb in order to reach a unanimous conclusion were so diffi-
cult that the process actually invited dissent. Thus, time, experience, and
the role of religion reveal to us the insight of the Prophet's declaration
that humans are not inclined to agree on matters of faith, and that the
only way to deem matters as actual law is to require full and unequivocal
agreement. So long as one thoughtful dissent appeared, the law could not
achieve permanence." 3 Ijma's significance lies not in the proposition it
presents-that if a community of believers within a given generation can
achieve assent on a religio-legal principle, then that principle becomes
infallible-but in the variety it allows. Thus, ijma should not be seen as
merely a seal to authenticity, but as a bulwark against discrete legal sen-
timents. Variance of opinion was not only present in the law; it was, in
fact, encouraged.'4
109. HALLAQ, supra note 42, at 28 (emphasis added).
110. See 1 KAMALI, supra note 41, at 197-99.
111. GLASSK, supra note 20, at 182.
112. HALLAQ, supra note 42, at 20, 27-28.
113. See id. at 75-78.
114. See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nai'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-
Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 19-20 (1990).
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4. The Effect of Legality
After a process of filtration through the sources, the Schools of Law
categorized various actions into what were essentially verdicts on how
they believed Muslims should deal with particular conduct. These five
categories are defined as whether one must, should, is permitted to,
should not, or must not do a particular act:
[A]ll human actions are subsumed, according to a widely ac-
cepted classification, under five categories: as commanded,
recommended, left legally indifferent, reprehended, or else pro-
hibited by God. And it is only in regard to the middle category
(i.e., those things which are left legally indifferent) that there is
in theory any scope for human legislation."5
Some Schools placed more emphasis on a particular source or meth-
odology than another, resulting in wide-ranging verdicts. On one hand,
since few matters were conclusive or reached the level of ijma, a pleth-
ora of conduct was subject to different interpretations based on which
School of Law dominated a particular geographic region. On the other
hand, because few matters reached the level of ijma, there was liberty in
interpreting various matters to suit the needs of one's faith. Some
schools believed one matter was forbidden, while another believed that is
was permissible, but not recommended. Nearly all of these categories
remained in constant flux."16 "Islamic law consisted of a set of methodo-
logical approaches, normative principles and positive commandments
that were in a constant state of evolvement.""' 7 Even though there are
differences in interpretation among the Schools of Law, diversity of
opinion was cultivated. In Islam, believers were not merely judged ac-
cording to their acts, but their intentions. Consequently, when a Muslim
follows a verdict that meets the requisite level of religious contempla-
tion, then that believer is essentially performing a religiously valid act.
Thus by implication, all religio-legal dictates were recognized as relig-
iously valid.'
The Schools of Law had, however, certain ground rules for legal
change. They maintained that change was permissible in the following
instances: when there was a passage of time with a change of place or
circumstance; when changes in the law were required to avoid ultimate
harm to human interests; when previous principles were based on a
115. GLASSt, supra note 20, at 381.
116. See I KAMALI, supra note 41, at 33-34.
117. EL FADL, supra note 59, at 170.
118. See Kimberly Schooley, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam and Human Rights: Toward a
Communitarian Revision, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 651, 660 (1994).
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cause which itself has disappeared; and when change or alteration served
the common interest of the community."9 As a consequence of broad-
based tolerance in the law, early Muslims lived in "an intellectually
dynamic milieu, characterized by a multiplicity of communities, schools
of thought and stances on major religio-political issues of the time."'"2 In
the fluid and intellectually effervescent atmosphere in which ordinary
individuals, as well as scholars and theorists, often moved freely among
different communities, Muslims engaged in lively discourse revolving
around a host of issues that were of vital significance to the emerging
Muslim umma. Muslims could not have lived such vigorous intellectual
lives and still formed what one author called "communities of
interpretation" had they been a mass of unquestioning people.
Consequently, Islam could not have expanded religiously or politically had
it not permitted differences of opinion and interpretation within faith's
fundamental confines.
5. The End of the Classical Era and a Note About Ijtihad
The end of the classical era of Islamic law followed the political and
military decline of Islamic Imperial States. Concomitantly, many jurists
called for an end to independent interpretation (ijtihad) of the Qur'an
and the Sunnah, which left jurists with methodologies of interpretation,
rather than interpretation of the sources independently. This approach
effectively closed the doors to ijtihad.'2' Once these doors were proverbi-
ally shut, jurists were functionally demoted to the rank of imitators
(muqallids), and they became bound by the doctrine of taqlid which is
loosely translated as an implicit acceptance. Thus, jurists were bound to
follow the doctrine as it was recorded in the authoritative legal manuals
generated by a particular School of Law. 22 This withholding of the right
of independent interpretation of the two primary sources was marked by
the phrase, "the closing of the door of ijtihad"',
23
Some scholars argued that adherence to taqlid ignored changing
conditions of society. Thus, the notion of an end to ijtihad is looked upon
119. Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's Rights, 12
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 7-8 (1997).
120. Asad Latif, Islam Has a Scope for Diversity, STRAITS TIMES INTERACTIVE (Singa-
pore), Oct. 16, 2001, at 18 (quoting an unknown Muslim Almanac).
121. SCHACHT, supra note 58, at 70-71. Professor Wael B. Hallaq argues that the "gate
of ijtihad" was never closed. Wael B. Hallaq, Was the Gate of ljtihad Closed?, 16 INT'L J.
MIDDLE E. STUD. 3, 15-22 (1984). He refutes this contention by showing that a number of
jurists, most notably lbn 'Abd al-Wahhab, continued the ijtihad of their predecessors by dis-
cussing their works and introducing new ideas well into the nineteenth century. Id. at 32.
122. See ALl ASGHAR, THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN ISLAM 49 (1996).
123. SCHACHT, supra note 58, at 71.
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with suspicion and distrust.' 24 Although many scholars have simplified
this debate in terms of intellectual and interpretative freedom, as if the
contrasts were black and white, this sentiment oversimplifies the subject.
The premise behind such conclusory sentiments like closing the
doors to ijtihad is based on the idea that a reopening of interpretation
still would require a fidelity to the whole of the Islamic legal tradition,
which means that in order to reinterpret the primary sources, one had to
be qualified in some sense. Reinstitution of ijtihad requires a rationale
for why this right was qualified in the first place.' 25 Arguably, the right to
conduct ijtihad was limited for functional reasons: if everyone possessed
such a right for any enduring length of time, especially in light of trying
to formulate working precedents, nothing would remain of Islamic law.
Ijtihad requires competence and expert technical knowledge in the
sources and methodologies of Islamic law.'26 This proposition is not dif-
ficult to conclude since espousing the law required that a person possess
an innate knowledge of the principal sources and methodologies and the
ability to analogize. ' In essence, a mujtahid (one capable of conducting
ijtihad) is a technician skilled with sufficient knowledge to exercise
competence, authority, and technical expertise. In other words, the prac-
tice of ijtihad requires a Muslim be more than an adherent to Islam, and
be more than merely familiar with thefiqh, it required the requisite level
of competence and caution to authoritatively espouse law on behalf of
the Divine. Thus, in a way, one could view the closing of the doors to
ijtihad, as a way to codify tolerance by preserving both the role of
prominent and well-educated jurists, while at the same preserving afiqh
that implicitly possessed a penchant for a diversity of opinion. Conse-
quently, while the classical legal tradition remains one of the hallmarks
of pax islamica, today it is often treated as an archaic aberration of in-
sight.
Of course, the classical era has faded into history, but the existential
question of what Islamic law is has not. This brief discussion is intended
to demonstrate the complexity and the brilliance of the legal tradition, as
well as the lengths to which scholars of law went in creating and deliver-
ing it. However, this analysis should not suggest that classical Islamic
law was perfect. The experience of history and the light of modernity
have either exposed or exacerbated the pitfalls of the classical legacy. For
example, while Muslims proffer Islam as a rational faith, rationalist-
based Schools of Law, like the Mu'tazilites, were condemned and erased
124. See id.
125. See I KAMALI, supra note 41, at 2.
126. See id. at 386-91.
127. See id. at 377-79.
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from the Islamic orthodoxy.128 While Islam is thought to be a religion
based on human intuition, it often takes a hostile position to intuitive
notions like human rights.'29 While Islamic law is proffered to respond to
future human exigencies, often exigencies forced litigants to respond to
Islamic law. Finally, while it is contended that Islamic law is as sophisti-
cated and as rich as any other legal system of the world, there is an
unmistakable tendency to drain this system of doctrinal richness and so-
phistication. "'
The point of a full-fledged discussion of classical Islamic law is two-
fold. First, it grounds the discussion about where Islamic law stood, and
gives a sense of demands for its complete reinstitution that are unwork-
able at best. Second, and more importantly, the point of emphasizing
early Islamic law is that all of those who desire a return to religiosity
will find that Islamic law is idealistic. Except for what has reached the
status of ijma-although one could imagine a variety of arguments
which suggest that very little has ever attained this status in the first
place-there are no legitimately codified precepts. Even if we were to
accept the benefits and burdens of either ijtihad and taqlid and the role
that jurists would play, one cannot conclude that Islamic law should go
about without some codification. Thus, the picture of Islamic law we get
today is far different from the intellectual tradition from which it sprung.
Like the ninth century jurist who reflectively posed the question of what
Islamic law was, today we encounter the same question, but under radi-
cally different circumstances. Islamic law today is in many ways
suffering an identity crisis. It "is neither a holdover from the past nor a
return to ancient roots but rather a complex, multistranded set of ideas
and practices ... likely to be determined by which ideology wins over
the Muslim mind," the Reformist or the Revivalist. 3
III. EXAMINING ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
At the outset, some might be perplexed by the presence of Islamic
fundamentalism in a discussion about the law. It is crucial, however, to
understand what is meant when discussing fundamentalism generally.
Fundamentalism is a concept used to define a reinvigoration of
128. See VIORST, supra note 1, at 157-62.
129. "Human rights law is based on an ill-defined philosophy combining natural law
impulses with positive law enactments which seek, for their part, to check arbitrary power."
Anthony Chase, Legal Guardians: Islamic Law, International Law, Human Rights Law and
the Salman Rushdie Affair, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 375, 382 (1996).
130. See EL FADL, supra note 59, at 175-76.
131. Jane F Collier, Intertwined Histories: Islamic Law and Western Imperialism, 5
STAN. HUMAN. REV. 152, 153 (1996) (book review).
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religiosity.32 Use of the word fundamentalism is not intended to draw
upon contemporarily pejorative connotations; rather it is an effort to
harmonize the use of this term as it was recognized in Protestant
Christianity.13 Religiosity means more than passionate displays of
religious devotion. Fundamentalists in various religious traditions teach
that there was a perfect moment and they endeavor to recover that
moment. This often involves reacting to that which is seen as a threat to
realizing the ideal-even if the ideal never actually existed. Given a
proper understanding of both Islam's emphasis on history, and the
implicit religiosity that surrounds a study of Islamic law,'3 4 it should not
seem surprising to find that Islam and its history are replete with
episodes of fundamentalism.'35
Although the causes of fundamentalism are many, and differ from
country to country, there are common catalysts and identifiable concerns.
Every evangelical religion has sought to renew adherence and reinstitute
them in truth faith. 3 Islam is no different-a Muslim polity requires
Islamic validity.
132. See Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the
Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Analysis Under the United Nations Charter, 35
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271, 275-78 (1997); see also John S. Hawley & Wayne Proudfoot,
Introduction, in FUNDAMENTALISM AND GENDER 1, 16-19 (John S. Hawley ed., 1994). But
see Gita Sahgal & Nira Yuval-Davis, Introduction: Fundamentalism, Multiculturalism and
Women in Britain, in REFUSING HOLY ORDERS 1, 3-4 (Gita Sahgal & NiraYuval-Davis eds.,
1992) (using fundamentalism to fuel anti-Muslim sentiments).
133. See JOHN ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT: MYTH OR REALITY 5 (3d ed. 1999)
[hereinafter ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT]; see also KAREN ARMSTRONG, THE BATTLE FOR
Goo xi (2000); Khurshid Ahmad, The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence, in VOICES OF RESUR-
GENT ISLAM 218, 225-26 (John Esposito ed., 1983).
134. See VIORST, supra note I, at 141-45.
135. A group of dedicated Muslims called the Kharijites emerged twenty years after
Muhammad's death and marked the first instance of Islamic fundamentalism. Through the
centuries, the phenomenon of fundamentalism continued, taking on various forms. In the
twentieth century, it was revived by several figures, including Hasan El Banna of Egypt, foun-
der of the Muslim Brotherhood. Fundamentalism is the term chosen by deeply committed
Muslims to describe themselves. These groups believe that Muslims all over the world should
return to the "fundamentals of the faith" and establish God's law on Earth as it is taught in the
Qur'an and through their traditions. See generally VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM, supra note
133.
136. An example of a fundamentalist group can be found in Jerry Falwell's ministry and
Moral Majority, Inc. See JERRY FALWELL, LISTEN AMERICA! 258 (1980) (detailing Christian
fundamentalism); Diane J. Austin-Broos, Pentecostals and Rastafarians: Cultural, Political,
and Gender Relations of Two Religious Movements, 36 Soc. & ECON. STUD. 1 (1987) (dis-
cussing Pentecostal and Rastafarian fundamentalism); D. Michael Quinn, Plural Marriage
and Mormon Fundamentalism, in 2 THE FUNDAMENTALISM PROJECT: FUNDAMENTALISMS
AND SOCIETY 240 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993) (describing Mormon
fundamentalism); Samuel C. Heilman & Menachem Friedman, Religious Fundamentalism
and Religious Jews: The Case of the Haredim, in I THE FUNDAMENTALISM PROJECT: FUNDA-
MENTALISMS OBSERVED 197 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1991) (detailing
Jewish haredium fundamentalists); DIANE Y. PAUL, WOMEN IN BUDDHISM: IMAGES OF THE
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For the vast majority of Muslims, the resurgence of Islam is a
reassertion of cultural identity, formal religious observance, fam-
ily values, and morality. The establishment of an Islamic society
is seen as requiring a personal and social transformation that is a
prerequisite for true Islamic government. Effective change is to
come from below through a gradual social transformation
brought about by implementation of Islamic law.'37
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, a renowned Islamic scholar, points out
a theme recurrent in the discussion of law, "[i]f we are to understand
anything at all about what has happened in the past and is happening
today in the Muslim world, we must appreciate the universality and cen-
trality of religion as a factor in the lives of the Muslim peoples."'38 The
consequence of such a truism is a requirement that modern States pos-
sessing Islamic majorities either adopt Islamic law or in some way seek
stricter adherence to Islamic law.
Consequently, most of Islamic history can be seen as a record of as-
pirations to an ideal State that would faithfully and impartially
implement Islamic law as a total way of life. These aspirations were
frustrated by the realities of political expediency and security concerns."'
When the balance would tilt too much in favor of the latter considera-
tions, however, the intensity of demands for the application of Islamic
law would rise, usually in the form of local or regional fundamentalist
movements. The common denominator to most of these movements,
much like the one advocated presently, is a reinvigoration of classical
Islamic law.'4° However, unlike other episodes of fundamentalism, this
period in history is unique and poses unprecedented challenges for those
who believe that a simple reinstitutionalization of Islamic law can be
accomplished within modernity's constraints. As a result of both novel
political and social concepts, as well as a burgeoning movement aimed at
FEMININE IN MAHAYANA TRADITION 3-5, 51 n.8, 52 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing Mahayana
Buddhist fundamentalism); Ainslie T. Embree, The Function of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh: To Define the Hindu Nation, in 4 THE FUNDAMENTALISM PROJECT: ACCOUNTING FOR
FUNDAMENTALISMS 617 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1994) (describing Hindu
fundamentalism).
137. John L. Esposito, Political Islam and U.S. Foreign Policy, 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 119 (Spring 1996).
138. ABDULLAHI AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES,
HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST) 3
(1996). For an account of the growing need to return to an Islamic identity in Turkey, see gen-
erally JUNE STARR, LAW AS METAPHOR: FROM ISLAMIC COURTS TO THE PALACE OF JUSTICE
(1992).
139. See Ahmad, supra note 133, at 222-24.
140. See ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT, supra note 133, at 119-20; see also M. H. A.
Reisman, Some Reflections on Human Rights and Clerical Claims to Political Power, 19 YALE
J. INT'L L. 509, 512-13 (1994).
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bolstering Islamic religiosity, there have emerged two ideologies claim-
ing to wear Islam's mantle-the Revivalists and the Reformists.'1
4
The dividing line between Reformist and Revivalist is not clearly in-
scribed. Distinctions between the two, however, are becoming more
apparent as the ascent of contemporary Revivalism continues 42 Al
though sometimes difficult to distinguish because of the way it narrows
the word fundamentalism,' 4 3 one scholar has identified this to be a debate
between religious conservatives and religious fundamentalists.
Scholars generally rely on the militant activism of fundamental-
ism to distinguish it from "conservative" or "traditional"
religion. Fundamentalists fight in and against society for politi-
cal, social, and legal changes, through the legal and political
system or by means of violence, whereas traditional conservative
groups appear more passive in accepting the political and legal
structures of society. Indeed fundamentalists have often critiqued
the traditional conservatives of their respective religions for not
being sufficiently involved in activist political ideology and mili-
tant action.
144
The dividing line, however, between Reformist and Revivalist is
especially important for a contemporary understanding of what Islamic
law is. At the outset, these terms are a bit ambiguous because the
distinctions, as ideologies, are sometimes difficult to distinguish for the
basic fact that both groups seek a return to religious values. Revivalism
is a uniquely contemporary phenomenon that seeks not only to institute
classical Islamic law, but in doing so, demolish or undercut some of
modernity's existing political and social structures-in particular, the
141. Although these terms deal with fundamentalists, they are used to identify what can
be seen as a split in the Islamic community. The terms have been borrowed from John
Esposito and others who adroitly point out that the term fundamentalists is disingenuous. This
group of academics prefer the term Revivalists for what are today known as "Islamists" or
"radical Islamic fundamentalists." This Note deliberately uses the term Revivalists, as this
ideological movement subjects the world to over simplistic representations about religion that
are more emotive than substantive. See Howland, supra note 132, at 276 n.7. See generally
ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT, supra note 133. The term Reformists emerges from an analy-
sis of the writings of the late, renowned scholar Fulzar Rahman. See generally FULZAR
RAHMAN, REVIVAL AND REFORM IN ISLAM (Ebrahim Moosa ed., 2000).
142. "The movement nowadays called fundamentalism is not the only Islamic tradition.
There are others, more tolerant, more open, that helped to inspire the great achievements of
Islamic civilization in the past, and we may hope that these other traditions will in time pre-
vail." Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1990, at 47, 60.
143. See Ahmad, supra note 133, at 225; see also ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT, supra
note 133, at 7-8; BASSAM TIB, THE CHALLENGE OF FUNDAMENTALISM: POLITICAL ISLAM
AND THE NEW WORLD DISORDER 5 (1998); John 0. Voll, Renewal and Reformn in Islamic His-
tory: Tajdid and Islah, in VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM, supra note 133. at 32, 32-35, 43.
144. Howland, supra note 132, at 281.
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nation-state and the modern notion of international law. On the other
hand, Reformism is in some ways also a unique contemporary creation.
While Reformists have opted not only to accept modernity's continued
existence, they also endeavor to make such concepts religiously
acceptable within the traditional constraints of Islamic law. In so doing,
rather than follow in what they consider the Revivalists' retail adherence
to Islamic law, they instead argue for a wholesale acceptance of Islamic
law. The following Part examines the Revivalists' complaint about
modernity, and briefly considers two well-accepted articulations of a
Revivalist institution of Islamic law. Following the discussion of
Revivalism, the next Part looks at the Reformist's response to two of the
more significant and enduring modern legal institutions-the nation-
state and international law.
IV. THE REVIVALIST COMPLAINT
There are numerous, multifaceted reasons for the emergence of
Revivalism. For some, Revivalism is a religious renewal in the wake of
modernity and globalization.4 For others, Revivalism is a move toward
political and economic segregation with a religious pretext fed by feel-
ings of defeat and disempowerment."'6 In their attempt to realize the ideal
religious moment, Revivalists would necessarily either ignore, or worse,
annihilate some of modernity's more salient political and social con-
cepts, such as the nation-state.
In general, the Revivalist movement is urban-based, drawing heavily
from the lower-middle and middle classes.4 7 Of particular import is the
growing participation of university graduates and young professionals,
both male and female.4 8 The movements recruit from the mosques and
on campuses where, contrary to popular assumptions, their strength is
not so much in the religious faculties and the humanities, but in science,
engineering, education, law, and medicine. 49 Their basic argument is
fairly simple, and, for the most part, an accepted ideology. Islam is not
145. ROXANNE EUBEN, ENEMY IN THE MIRROR: ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE
LIMITS OF MODERN RATIONALISM 20 (1999).
146. See JUDITH MILLER, GOD HAS NINETY-NINE NAMES 17 (1996).
147. See id.; see also ALl RAHNEMA, PIONEERS OF THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL 111 (1994).
148. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 133, at 293-99; see also Ibrahim Ahmad Omar, Con-
textualization ... Whence, and How Far Have We Come?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 108, 108-09
(Mona M. Abul-Fadl ed., 1993) (describing the International Institute of Islamic Thought's
efforts in placing professors in universities around the world, sponsoring conferences, and
fostering discourse among scholars).
149. See ESPosITo, THE ISLAMIC THREAT, supra note 133, at 137-39.
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just a collection of beliefs and ritual actions, but a comprehensive ideol-
ogy embracing public as well as personal life.150
Although this vastly oversimplifies history, two major events have
heralded the rise of the Revivalist movement. Specifically, the first her-
ald of contemporary Revivalism was the era of European colonialism
and the succeeding, but badly maligned era when Islam became part of
the province of modern nation-states, rather than the preeminent social
order of all Muslims.
For nearly all of its history, some thirteen centuries, Islam has
thrived under empires or imperial States in which both religion and poli-
tics were united.'1' However, for more than two hundred years, the
Islamic world was carved up among dominating European powers. This
era ended slowly, as the last of the Islamic empires, the Ottoman Empire,
disintegrated at the beginning of the twentieth century.'52 The rest of
what would become the modern Islamic world waited until the end of
colonization and World War II to become recognized nation-states.
Rather than have any opportunity create their own identity as nation-
states, many of these newly born Islamic States' needs were eclipsed by
the constant threat of nuclear annihilation between the United States and
the Soviet Union. The Cold War gave license to many of these newly
formulated nations to subdue religious fundamentalism. Dueling super-
powers, in their attempt to control their respective spheres of influence,
antagonized those who sought to establish their own distinct Islamic
identity. For as many as fifty years, many Islamic States' political sys-
tems froze, as underlying resentment grew.153
In the midst of the Cold War, came the second major signpost to
Revivalism-the Israeli invasion and occupation of Arab held territories.
In 1967, Israel defeated six Arab armies and took control of the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, including the city of Jerusalem, site of Islam's
third holiest site (behind Mecca and Medina).14 The takeover of
Jerusalem from Islamic control signaled the ultimate failure of Muslims
to take account of their faith.'5 For thousands of years, Islam flourished
under vast empires and added novel dimensions to every major human
150. See id. at 122-23; see also HALLAQ, supra note 42, at 11; Hassan al-Banna, The
New Renaissance, in ISLAM IN TRANSITION: MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES 78 (John J. Donohue &
John L. Esposito eds., 1982); Abul Ala Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam, in ISLAM IN
TRANSITION: MUSLIM PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 252.
151. See TIBI, supra note 143, at 5-8.
152. See generally RUTHVEN, supra note 44.
153. See EsPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT, supra note 133, at 75, 193; see also BLACK,
supra note 27, at 308.
154. Deemed the "Year of Catastrophe." See ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT, supra note
133, at 12-13.
155. See JOHN ESPOSITO, ISLAM AND POLITICS 11-12 (1998).
[Vol. 24:273
Nothing is Written
endeavor. Arguably, up until 1967, most Muslims maintained both a
religiously supremacist view of the world, as well as a mentality which
essentially longed for an empire.1 6 The loss of Jerusalem signaled a need
for Muslims to once again assert themselves against those who
controlled them. 57
In sum, modernity, for the Revivalist, represents more than the
Enlightenment, the proliferation of democracy, and the birth of modern
economics. Instead, modernity represents the continued defeat of Islam,
first in a territorial sense with the collapse of Islamic empires, but more
so in a religious sense with the capture of some of Islam's most
venerated sites, and, more latently, the denigration of religious ideas.
Formally, Islamic legal systems were uprooted and replaced by the
English common law or by the French civil codes. The quiet but
dramatic end of the Cold War further unveiled the fragility of Islamic
political systems, as well as the wholesale failure of their economies and
social systems.' 8 Consequently, many Muslims turned from failed
attempts at nationalism, instead focusing their efforts on Revivalism. 9
Revivalists believed that secular nationalism-whether in the form of
liberal nationalism, Arab nationalism, or socialism-did not provide a
sufficient sense of identity for Muslims. Thus, it is important to
acknowledge that Revivalism is not created by, and is not the same as
Saddam Hussein's rule in Iraq or even the emergence of the Ayatollah
Khomeini's Islamic revolution in Iran. The governments in Muslim
countries, mostly non-elected, authoritarian, and dependent on brutal
force, have been unable to establish their political legitimacy without
taking cues from the Revivalist movements which have grown within
them.'" Consequently, Revivalism can be viewed as a construction of
non-State actors who have emerged in the context of modernity, but do
not accept its constraints.1
6
1
Today, in the post- 1967/post-Cold War era, a thorough self-evaluation
has confirmed Revivalist suspicions that all is not well within Islam.
Indeed, what Arabs find at home is economic lethargy and social
stagnation. The energy, the daring entrepreneurial experience
156. See RUTHVEN, supra note 44, at 101-40.
157. See id.
158. See VIORST, supra note I, at 5-7.
159. The founders of many Islamic movements were often formerly participants in na-
tionalist movements. Examples include Hasan al-Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,
Rashid Ghannoushi of Tunisia's Renaissance party and Abbasi Madani of the Islamic Salva-
tion Front in Algeria. See Ahmad, supra note 133, at 222-23.
160. See EUBEN, supra note 145, at 29.
161. See Bassam Tibi, The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Secular Order in the Middle
East, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 191, 194 (Spring 1999).
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that suddenly appeared in the Pacific societies remains long
absent in the Middle East. The Arab world seems weighed down
by the pessimism over its future, if not outright despair.
Unfortunately, the rest of the world seems indifferent to this
condition. The headlines in the international press that deal with
the Middle East point instead to the violence and terrorism that
are made out to be that region's product.'
6 2
In addition, it would seem that nearly every part of the Islamic world
has been affected: the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict;' 63 the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict involving Syria, Lebanon, and Israel;'6 constant
rumblings between the now-nuclear power of India and Pakistan;615 con-
flict between Chechnya/Dagestan and Russia;
66 civil war in Algeria; 7
Muslim-Christian violence in Nigeria and the Sudan;'68 Sunni-Shi'a con-
flicts in Pakistan,' 69 Bosnia, Kosovo, and Serbia; Iraqi, Turkish, and
Iranian persecution of the Kurds; 7' violence in the Xinjiang province of
China;'12 and, of course, the attacks by Osama bin Laden on the World
Trade Center, the Pentagon, the U.S.S. Cole, and the U.S. Embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania,' 3 to name a few, illustrate Islam's many problems.
In addition, Islamic States have been blamed for their failure to
achieve economic self-sufficiency, to stem the widening gap between
rich and poor, to halt widespread corruption, to liberate Palestine and,
most of all, to resist Western political and cultural hegemony. Both the
political and the religious establishments have come under criticism, the
162. See VIORST, supra note 1, at 6.
163. See Thorn Shanker, A Nation Challenged: The Allies; Rumsfeld to Visit Troops Sta-
tioned in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, at B4.
164. See James Bennet, The World: About Face; What Does He Want? The Enigma That
Is Sharon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, Sec. 4, at 1, 6.
165. See David Sanger, A Nation Challenged: Diplomacy; Bush Hails Musharraf and
Warns Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at AI6.
166. See, e.g., Patrick Tyler, Russian Defector Says Army Killed Civilians in Chechnya,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, Sec. 1, at 8.
167. See, e.g., Agence France-Presse, World Briefing Africa: Algeria: Elections Set for
May, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2002, at A I4.
168. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, World Briefing Africa: Nigeria: Soldiers On Patrol As
Tensions Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at A18.
169. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, Pakistan Seethes as the Militants Lash Out, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 2002, at A22.
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former as a Westernized, secular elite overly concerned with power and
privilege, and the latter as corrupted by leaders appointed by the very
governments who control mosques, religious universities, and other
institutions. 74 As a consequence, Revivalists have fired the first salvo at
their own governments:
[A] significant minority views the societies and governments in
Muslim countries as hopelessly corrupt. They believe that un-
Islamic societies and their leaders are no better than infidels and
that the religious establishment has been co-opted by the gov-
ernment. Such critics believe that both established political and
religious elites must be overthrown and a new Islamically com-
mitted leadership chosen and Islamic law imposed. These radical
revolutionary groups, though relatively small in membership,
have proved effective in political agitation, disruption, and as-
sassination.' 5
Nevertheless, the Revivalist complaint is most vehemently directed
at all things that are non-Islamic. Revivalists need only remind their fol-
lowers of the picture previously painted to justify the West's (un)Islamic
practices. By fanning the flames of religious fervor, fanatics justify their
attacks in religious terms, explaining that the West created secularism,
an idea without historical or religious precedent.'7 6 In addition, they
claim that foolhardy dependence on Western political and economic
models of development has produced the politically stagnant and so-
cially corrosive systems seen today. In essence, they claim that the West
undermined the identity and moral fabric of Muslim societies.' Revival-
ists even renounce whatever present economic bounty that exists in some
parts of the Islamic world. They often dismiss the mighty petrodollar as
a constant reminder of the continued capitulation of Islamic States to the
influences of Western nations.' Of course, while there are patent ab-
surdities in the dilemmas they pose, their implicit attempt to obtain
Islamic validity for political solutions remains powerfully salient.'7 9
174. See El Fadl, supra note 60, at 34.
175. Esposito, supra note 14, at 133.
176. See BERNARD LEWIS, ISLAM AND THE WEST 180-84 (1994).
177. EsPOSITo, THE ISLAMIC THREAT, supra note 133, at 53-62.
178. See id. 225-26.
179. Thus, Revivalists utilize the instruments of modernity, but believe that one can
carve out pieces of liberated territories to be freed from modernity. They often demonstrate
their indifference to the attempts of numerous other entities throughout the world that share
their concern and disdain for globalization. Although Revivalists are venomous in their attacks
on United States foreign policy, they lack a willingness to institute political freedom, thereby
accepting the abundance of repression in their own societies.
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Revivalists see the present discontent within the constraints of
modernity as a choice: Muslims will either have to fully engage in their
societies or fully dismiss their religious roots, since the second choice
poses no choice at all, they must accept the first solution. Revivalists are
guided principally by the mindset of the empire. They are essentially
attempting to recapture the Islamic umma of the Prophet Muhammad.'80
They contend that true Islamic revitalization will only be accomplished
through the reinstitution of Islamic law. For Revivalists, Islamic law is a
proven system, ready with implicit religious legitimacy and possessing
the authority to reestablish the link enjoyed by the Prophet and his
earliest followers. In general, the Revivalist considers solely political
solutions as inept, and demands that they be replaced with Islamic
solutions. For example, many Revivalists argue that Muslim nation-
states should have no role in the development of the judiciary.' Instead,
Revivalists argue that judicial matters should be left solely to religion.
Even today, calls for a renewed Islamic legal system continue to gain
resonance in many States where Western and Soviet legal systems once
reigned.82
Now, having a sense of the Revivalist motives for the reinstitution of
Islamic law, it is important to examine how, in fact, a Revivalist concep-
tion of Islamic law would appear. In order to gain a fuller sense for the
precise mechanics of the Revivalist ideological mindset, two, of many,
personas who have envisioned the reinstitution of Islamic law will be
examined.
A. Wahhab & Qutb: Revivalism's Ideological Leaders
Although it would be historically inaccurate to reduce Revivalist
movements into an entirely cohesive sentiment, both the Wahhabist
movement of modern-day Saudi Arabia,' 83 and the writings of Sayyid
180. See RUTHVEN, supra note 44, at 182-98.
181. See, e.g., Lino J. Lauro & Peter A. Samuelson, Toward Pluralism in Sudan: A Tradi-
tionalist Approach, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 79 (1996).
182. See infra Appendix (detailing the legal systems of the various members of the Or-
ganization of the Islamic Conference). See, e.g., Evan Gottesman, The Reemergence of the
Qisas and the Diyat in Pakistan, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 433 (1996) (describing the
reinstitution of Islamic law from the former common law system in Pakistan).
183. In the late eighteenth century, the Al Sa'ud family, under the leadership of 'Abd al-
'Aziz ibn Sa'ud, united with the Wahhabi movement and rebelled against Ottoman rule in
Arabia. Wahhabism, however, did not propagate itself as one school of thought or as a particu-
lar orientation within Islam. Rather, it asserted itself as the orthodox, "straight path" of Islam.
By claiming literal fidelity to the Islamic text, Wahhabism was able to make a credible claim
to authenticity at a time when Islamic identity was contested. Wahhabism is the dominant
Islamic tradition on the Arabian Peninsula, though its influence is greatly reduced in the rest
of the Middle East. See EL FADL, supra note 59, at 73 n.43. As Osama bin Laden comes from
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Qutb illustrate the Revivalist approach to Islamic law. Although
Wahhabism is considered a "minority" position, it has been influential
for the Revivalist movement in toto:
Wahhabism and its militant offshoots share both attitudinal and
ideological orientations. Both insist on a normative particularism
that is fundamentally text-centered; both reject the notion of
universal human values; and both deal with the other, however
defined, in a functionalist and even opportunistic fashion. 
84
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab could be considered the first Reviv-
alist. In essence, he advocated following a history that ended in the ninth
century. He likened much of the post-ninth century Islamic world to a
retrogression to pre-Islamic Arabia.' 5 Wahhab was particularly dismayed
at the widespread laxity in adhering to traditional Islamic laws involving
religious devotions. He cast himself as acting in accordance with the ex-
ample set by the Prophet himself, and claimed that contemporary
Muslims should not hesitate to oust the kinds of politically repressive
and irreligious governments that the Prophet Muhammad worked to
overthrow.'8 6 He was convinced that because so many Muslims tolerated
their precarious existence, they were in fact not really Muslims after all.
Wahhabism "reformed" and "revived" Islam, not by opening it up to the
world, but by turning deeply inward and becoming narrow, intolerant,
rigid, literalistic, and puritanical.'87 In particular, Wahhab advocated strict
literalism in which the text of the Qur'an became the sole source of au-
thority, thereby expressing an extreme hostility toward intellectualism,
mysticism, and any sectarian divisions within Islam. Consequently,
Wahhabi religious leaders rejected any reinterpretation of the Qur'an
when it came to issues settled by the earliest Muslims.
Perhaps the most influential figure of Islamic Revivalism is Sayyid
Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. '88 A terse analysis of Sayyid
Qutb's popular Revivalist writings reveals a doctrinal resonance with the
Saudi Arabia and is Wahhabi himself, Wahhabi extremism and radical ideas of purity have
obviously influenced him considerably.
184. El Fadl, supra note 60, at 35.
185. See GLASS9, supra note 20, at 414-16.
186. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islam and the Theology of Power, in MIDDLE E. REP.,
Winter 2001, at 221, available at http://www.merip.org/mer/mer221/221 abu-el-fadl.html
187. The Wahhabist approach is premised on the arrogant belief that, since the end of the
Rightly Guided Caliphs, Muslims have failed to fulfill God's will. Instead, they propose that,
if Islam were to return to its authentic form, the entire community would be better off. This
insipid approach is hopelessly simplistic and na'fve. See EL FADL, supra note 59, at 73.
188. Among his popular writings is a thirty-volume translation and commentary of the
Qur'an. Additionally, Qutb's teachings were instrumental in the Iranian revolution. See
Yvonne Haddad, Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival, in VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM,
supra note 133, at 68.
Fall 2002]
Michigan Journal of International Law
Wahhabist movement. He inspired many of the radical Islamic move-
ments of the 1970s and 1980s in the Middle East and Northern Africa,
and his ideas of an Islamic society have been used repeatedly. Qutb has
also influenced numerous generations of Egyptian and Arab intellectuals
who seek to understand Islam as an ideology that leads to changes in the
social order. 9 His prolific teachings are known the world over and, more
importantly, much of his writing serves as comprehensive doctrine for
how Islam actually condones terrorism and fosters a mindset of extreme
exclusivity.190
Qutb considered Islam-political Islam, especially-to be the only
alternative to the ills of contemporary Muslim society.' 9' Although
Qutb's writings incorporate many topics, his most notable writings were
those about religious ignorance and his fear that modern Egypt was fal-
ling into the grips of a Western spirituality.'92 Qutb felt that Islam was in
danger of spiritual imperialism from the West and sought primarily to
protect Islam from this interference. Qutb believed wholeheartedly in the
supreme nature of Islam, and he felt that he needed to use radical politi-
cal tactics to achieve his ends. His widely read book, Milestones, made
the case that current Islamic social systems never achieved a truly Is-
lamic society. 93 His impressions colored the world in stark terms of
black and white. According to Qutb, a society whose legislation does not
rest on divine law is not Muslim, no matter how ardently its individuals
may proclaim themselves Muslim, even if they pray, fast, and make the
pilgrimage.' 94 In addition, the ruler of a Muslim nation who does not im-
plement Islamic law is not really a Muslim. That being the case, they are
not really a Muslim ruler any more, but rather an infidel. This means that
they can be killed with impunity. The only solution for the ills of such a
189. SeeMILLER, supra note 146, at 59.
190. See Haddad, supra note 188, at 68. Qutb's brand of militancy, and his justification
for fanaticism, however, is not novel. Rather, it is a new spin on the old idea of hatred itself.
We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before.
They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century.
By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions-by abandoning every value
except the will to power-they follow in the path of fascism, nazism, and totalitari-
anism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history's
unmarked grave of discarded lies.
President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People (Sept 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010920-8.html.
191. See Ibrahim Abu Rabi, Sayyid Qutb: From Religious Realism to Radical Social
Criticism, 28 ISLAMIC Q. 103, 104 (1984).
192. See Haddad, supra note 188, at 68-72.
193. See generally SAYYID QUTB, MILESTONES (rev. ed. 1991).




society is, again, a wholesale adoption of Islamic law.'95 It is important to
note, however, that Qutb, for all of his judicial sentiments about Islam
and Islamic law, was not trained as a jurist.'96
The justification for an implicitly rigid approach to Islamic society
and political philosophy is the Islamic concept of jahiliyya.'97 Jahiliyya
primarily means "ignorance," but it is also a term used to characterize
the time before the Prophet's message. More specifically, jahiliyya is
characterized by a way of life without regard to what God has pre-
scribed. Invoking jahiliyya allows one the right to create values and to
legislate rules of collective behavior. Revivalists have used this powerful
tool to justify overthrowing what are ostensibly Islamic States by deny-
ing that they are truly Islamic at all. Of course, the term can be easily
manipulated to extend to Western societies as well. According to Qutb,
any non-Muslim society implicitly qualifies asjahiliyya because, accord-
ing to their systems of governance, God is not sovereign-instead, men
and their laws are sovereign, replacing God in his rightful place. By ex-
panding the use of jahiliyya to include contemporary society, he
articulated an Islamic justification for revolution and sedition.
From an analysis of their works, both Qutb and Wahhab essentially
refused to interpret Islamic law historically or contextually, with any at-
tendant possibilities of reinterpretation under changed circumstances.
Both treat the vast majority of Islamic history simplistically and as a cor-
ruption of the true and authentic Islam. Their adherence to a doctrine of
ossified history suggests a broader opposition to any reinterpretation of
classical Islamic law, especially in the realm of modern notions such as
gender, family, and religious rights. Although no one would argue
against a return to fundamentals as a matter of religiosity, the Revivalist
approach would reduce the value of both the Qur'an and the Sunnah by
erasing their historical context and disregarding the essential fact that
Islamic law has never existed without tolerance and historical variance.
B. The Pitfalls of Revivalism
By adhering to a Revivalist approach to Islamic law, little remains of
the tolerant, classical approach. While the classical jurist and the
contemporary Reformist would likely analyze a factual scenario in light
of the overall moral thrust of the Qur'anic message, the Revivalist
essentially reads Qur'anic verses in isolation, with the insipid
assumption that such verses are transparent and that their historical
195. See id.
196. See Rabi, supra note 191, at 106 (stating that Qutb, at best, received a traditional
religious education along with a general college education).
197. See Haddad, supra note 188, at 85-87.
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context was irrelevant.19 Many of the institutions referenced in the
Qur'an can be understood only if the reader is aware of the historical
practices surrounding the revelation of the text. The Revivalist's attempt
at interpretation is, of course, baffling to anyone familiar with the
classical heritage or even vaguely aware of the roles the Sunnah, qiyas,
or ijma play in the development of Islamic law. Simply stated, the
untrained Revivalist would be inclined, out of ease, and frankly, out of
ignorance, to examine Qur'anic matters in isolation. However, as the
above discussion indicates, the role of history is not merely presented for
purposes of discussion, but is at the heart of a true understanding of the
Islamic religion itself.'99 By draining the Qur'an both of its historical and
moral context, the Revivalist transforms the text into a long list of
morally non-committal legal commands. In essence, internalizing history
with revelation is the point of a jurist's job.
The legal salience of many Revivalist claims rests on religious pre-
tenses so that they ostensibly create an Islamic mythology that extends
far beyond the mythos of early classical Islam. The predominance of le-
gally untrained religious leaders has lead to a misunderstanding of the
classical Islamic legal tradition.
It is an irony of history that, while rejecting the institution of
organized priesthood, Islam has often fallen into the hands of
priests.... For centuries, ill-educated Mullahs [religious
scholars] have often monopolized the pulpit. On the one hand,
the Mullah has woven into Islam a crazy network of fantasy and
fanaticism. On the other, he has often tried to use it as an elastic
cloak for political power and expediencies. The result in both
cases is chaotic. Inside the mosque, the Mullah has made Islam
into a fairy tale immersed in strange superstitutions [sic] and
opposed to all forces of progress. Outside the mosque, he has
often made it a pliant handmaid of power politics.
2°°
198. See El Fadl, supra note 60, at 35. Consider the following:
The application of shari'ah law exclusively and its totality is not possible today
without compromising admixtures of modern ideas (as exemplified by the reform-
ers who adopt modern rationalism as axiomatic), or through stultifying
simplification; it cannot be unless the world itself were to return to another age.
And this is not feasible for whole societies without changes of cosmic proportions
which are out of human hands, whatever may be possible for individuals. This was
foreseen by prophecy, for there was a saying attributed to the Prophet that "In the
beginning if one omits a tenth of the law, one will be punished, but at the end of
time, if one accomplishes the law, one will be saved."
GLASS9, supra note 20, at 362.
199. See VIORST, supra note 1, at 141.
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Revivalists' cursory view of the law and shortsighted evaluation of
the sacred texts stands in sharp contrast to the classical approach to the
law. The Revivalists' methodology, which includes renewed calls for ijti-
had, denies Islamic law of any sense of integrity, seriousness, or viability
in the modern age. "[I]n many ways, Islamic law became the playing
field for shabby scholarship, political sloganism, and ideological dema-
gogues."20' Revivalists are often "political and social Islamic activists
who [have] enjoyed a minimal degree of training in the Islamic scholas-
tic tradition and reconstructed Islamic law into a set of highly simplified
and dogmatic commands. [Revivalist] formulations ... became poorly
justified and a non-persuasive set of rules and not a methodology for an
open process of discourse and determination.""'
The key to understanding Revivalism is not in its advocacy of
Islamic solutions, but rather in the fact that the Revivalists' position
could only achieve salience in an era of legal ignorance. Although one
can concede that every faith believes its opinions are paramount when
compared to others, it seems illogical that, in the process of returning to
fundamentals, an entire ideology could ignore the very premises which
made an adherence to Islamic law great-implicit tolerance of divergent
viewpoints. The contemporary Revivalist reaches not for Islamic law, but
for the fiqh. Even in their attempt to grapple with Shafi'i's fiqh, they
should not, as a matter of principle or as a matter of logic, conclude that
the fiqh declares complete certainty. In light of the Prophet's death and
the absence of God's revelation, it is imperative that tolerance be seen as
the touchstone for both thefiqh and Islamic law as a whole.
What seem to fill the Revivalists' logical vacuum are implicit
nationalist components oriented toward cultural and political
dominance.0 3 For all their distaste of modernity, Revivalist positions
could only gain recognition through the prolonged absence of Islamic
institutions witnessed in the modern era. Revivalists are not satisfied
with living according to their own personal preferences. Instead they
attempt, sometimes violently, to crush any deviation from their views of
what life should be.2t 4 Returning to a point made earlier, one of the
advantages of the classical legal system was its tendency to jealously
guard those who could engage in the interpretation of the original
sources. That jealousy was not entirely misguided, for as we have seen,
in the modern era many Muslims, unaided by the dictates of history as
well as the pitfalls of the sources, often take the burdens of interpretation
201. EL FADL, supra note 59, at 172.
202. Id.
203. See ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC THREAT, supra note 133, at 62-64.
204. See Khaled Abou el Fadl, What Became of Tolerance in Islam?, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
14, 2001, at BI 1.
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too lightly. This, combined with the kind of intolerance imbued by
notions of jahiliyya, allows them to deceive and misguide under the
banner of Islamic law. Essentially, Revivalists have attempted to turn an
incredible tradition of legal scholarship into a residue of mechanics and
2051technicalities sufficient to appease the masses.
V. THE REFORMIST RESPONSE
The growing devotion to contemporary Revivalism coupled with a
strict adherence to its propositions would destroy the essential reasons
classical Islamic law was regarded as a credible legal tradition in the first
place. It calls for a resolute response by the silent majority of Muslim
scholars. This Note has deliberately termed this group of contemporarily
existing, but classically minded, group of scholars Reformists. Although
at some level Reformists believe in the baseline proposition of funda-
mentalism-a return to religiosity-they are intent upon reforming the
larger fundamentalist movement by making certain that there is an ade-
quate fidelity to the classical legal tradition.
The traditional and protective institutions in place during the classi-
cal era have fundamentally changed under the innovations of modernity.
In the past, the jurist was the natural defender of classical Islamic law
and could wield a powerful sword against either the unprincipled scholar
or the recalcitrant ruler .2 Traditionally, the tension between Islamic le-
gitimacy and political expediency was mediated by rulers and jurists,
whereby the former acknowledged the religious supremacy of Islamic
law and the latter conceded the practical political authority of the rul-
ers."' Traditionally, jurists were highly regarded and well favored for
their ability to avoid collusive tactics with the governing authority and
safeguard the independence of religious law. Today, the State now con-
trols the private endowments that sustain the juristic class. Thus, by
intertwining the authority of the State with the jurist, it is unclear which
voice speaks on matters of religion, especially with a religion that re-
mains central to the dynamics of public legitimacy and cultural
200meaning.
Reformists are essentially the mainstream of Islam, whose true
adherence is not merely an invocation of fundamentals, but rather an
adherence to the whole of the Islamic tradition. Unlike Revivalists like
Qutb and Wahhab, it is often difficult to parse out well-named
205. See id.
206. See El Fadl, supra note 60, at 34; see also EL FADL, supra 59, at 15.
207. See EL FADL, supra note 59, at 15.
208. See El Fadl, supra note 60, at 34.
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Reformists for two simple reasons. First, many do not wish to speak
against the more politically powerful Revivalists. Second, for those who
are courageous enough to share their message of tolerance, deliberation,
and devotion, they do not often receive the same kinds of notorious
acclaim as those Revivalists who espouse emotionally satisfying
messages aimed at ameliorating a Muslim's basic concerns. 29 Despite
the lack of popularity that Reformists are likely to attain, there is a
growing need to respond to the impending tide of Revivalism.
The intellectuals, the liberal-minded [of] the Islamic world are
so apologetic and defensive; they concede to the fundamentalists
more than what the fundamentalists are asking for themselves.
Most of all, they concede to the fundamentalists the legitimacy
and the right and the ability to define the issues and to define the
space of discourse. That is something that we have to question
among ourselves. We are not simply dealing with someone who
holds a counterview, but we are dealing with our own internal
defeat, which gives that counterview more weight than it de-
serves. One of the issues that one finds in discussing questions
of cultural specificity or relativism and religious fundamentalism
is the fear that by engaging in a cultural or religious discourse
you are conceding the platform, you are conceding the terms of
reference to the other side.20
Consequently, if all Muslims were to submit to the Revivalist posi-
tion of maintaining a corpus of law which is deprived of its innate
vitality, one would find it to be much like how Dr. Abou El Fadl de-
scribes it. If Islamic law were nothing more than a set of positive
commandments, i.e., a set of rules, then Islamic law is thriving. In fact,
Islamic law has staunchly resisted codifications or uniformity, at
least until the contemporary age. The earmark of traditional
Islamic methodology has been its open-ended and antiauthoritar-
ian character. Fundamental to this character was an evolutionary
process of exploration, investigation, and adjudication that, ac-
cording to its own inner logic resisted settlement or inertia.2'
209. Some prominent Reformists include Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, Khaled Abou El
Fadl, and Abdullahi An-Na'im. See generally MAHMOUD MOHAMED TAHA, THE SECOND
MESSAGE OF ISLAM (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im trans., 1987).
210. Abdullahi An-Na'im, Remarks of Abdullahi An-Na'im, 44 Am. U. L. REV. 1383,
1384 (1995).
211. EL FADL, supra note 59, at 171.
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If Islamic law means more than the sum of its rule, i.e., inclusive of fiqh,
or the intellectual synthesis, then "Islamic law, for the most part, is
dead."'
The major problem a Reformist faces in defending modernity's insti-
tutions is that any implicit acceptance of modernity effectively erases the
possibility of an independent religious evaluation of modernity's institu-
tions. As modernity itself has removed the independence of religious
scholars to some extent, any views that in some way support an institu-
tion will always seem suspect. 213 In addition, because there is a lack of
clear, representative authority to defend that paradigm of Islamic law, the
responsibility of defending the classical paradigm actually falls on the
shoulders of a broader group of quasi jurists who would inevitably par-
take in the same kinds of "independent" interpretation as their Revivalist
counterparts. Both an emphasis on training and a fundamental adherence
to the broad-based acceptance of tolerant positions evident in the classi-
cal era, however, can mitigate concerns that Reformists may become as
unprincipled as Revivalists in their espousals of the law.
For all of the concerns voiced about qualifications, and about ijtihad
more particularly, any observer of Islamic law has to take into account
the fact that jurists, for all of their greatness, were still human. One need
not probe too deeply to note the heavy role that scholars such as Malik,
Ibn Hanbal, Hanafi and Shafi'i have played in the formulation of the law
itself. Admittedly, classical Islamic law is built on the work of jurists, not
merely the Divine. However, it is the repeated insistence for jurists that
in some ways undermine attempts at tolerance.2 4 Consequently, the
insistence that caution be employed in formulating the law should also be
extended with regard to jurists. From an unqualified dependence on jurists,
to accepting opinions without juridical training at all, any authority that
dislodges the role of the Deity should be regarded as suspect. So long as
the gulf remains between humanity and the ultimate source of the Divine
law, humanity, whether in the classical or the contemporary era, should not
shy away from tackling the issues that surround the law."5 In addition,
throughout the course of Islamic history, one notes the disappearance of
several Schools of Law, the departure of quasi rationalism and the
emphasis placed on scholars rather than the authority of the jurists. This
authoritarian persuasion within Islamic law, however, cannot be seen as a
purely positive development. Often those willing to defend the classical
era are motivated by a desire to respond to the Revivalists, but are muted
212. Id.; see also WAEL HALLAQ, AUTHORITY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN ISLAMIC
LAW 126 (2001).
213. See El Fadl, supra note 60, at 34-35.
214. See EL FADL, supra note 59, at 62-63.
215. See THE KORAN, supra note 5, at 6:57 ("Judgment is for God only").
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by their personal fidelity to the classical regard for jurists. It seems,
however, that rather than placing a premium on juristic status alone,
Reformists would likely profit more by tempering their opinions and by
placing a premium on tolerance.
Although their legal assertions may be different, and their interpre-
tive paradigms distinct, the Reformist position should not be viewed as a
mutually exclusive paradigm. Rather it should be seen as encompassing
the Revivalist model. Undoubtedly, Revivalists have made valid points
and spurred a Reformist response. In fact, one could posit that it was the
intellectual laziness of the Reformist position that gave rise to a more
undisciplined and illogical Revivalist approach. The Revivalist position
should not be underestimated, but engaged. Religious validity is integral,
but validity must have more than political assent; it must have a religious
basis.2 6 The repressive modern regimes of the present have often been to
blame for the extreme acts of the Revivalist movement.2 7 To suppress the
Revivalist position with greater ferocity will inevitably lead to an even
greater, more venomous, and, arguably, more stubborn legal and political
backlash.28
To conclude, the Revivalist interpretation of Islamic law is intention-
ally simplistic. The only way for the Reformist to succeed in persuading
contemporary Muslims of the religious validity of their positions is to
establish comprehensive arguments that are religiously 
salient. 219
To fully comprehend the debate between Revivalist and Reformist, it
is important to keep in mind the legal and social hurdles that classical
Islamic law must overcome. These hurdles are not merely replicated le-
gal notions that have reemerged from the past. Rather they are entirely
novel legal concepts: the nation-state 220 and modern public international
law.' On the one hand, although the modern nation-state stands in stark
contrast to the Islamic concept of a State, Muslim scholars have, in some
ways, been able to rectify religious disparities by focusing their attention
on Islamic law's most salient features including family law. On the other
hand, the concept of international law poses an even greater religious
difficulty. The following discussion attempts to address some of the
216. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 138, at 3.
217. See EsPosrro, THE ISLAMIC THREAT, supra note 133, at 212-21.
218. See id. at 214-21.
219. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 138, at 3.
220. The next two Sections discuss two of the more obstinate hurdles to the Reformists'
success and offer responses that are based on an understanding of classical Islamic law. Know,
however, that these propositions are offered with the full cognizance that I am not a certified
legal jurist. I operate on the compulsion that for whatever legal training I possess, it can be no
less principled or less intellectual than the proffered and unprincipled arguments often foisted
by my Revivalist counterparts.
221. See generally Westbrook, supra note 10.
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more obvious misconceptions and demonstrate that, in the case of both
the nation-state as well as international law generally, Islamic law's ten-
ets remains a valid and resonating legal tradition.
A. The Contemporary Nation-State and Islam
Political scientists could justifiably argue that the religious accep-
tance of the conceptual nation-state would be redundant, as nearly the
entire globe, including the Islamic world, is composed of nation-states 2
Although empirically justifiable, this position misses the basic point that
even political establishments must carry some notion of religious valid-
ity in order to gain widespread acceptance. Concomitantly, recent
Revivalist movements, designed to justify Islam as the basis for their
authority, typically make implementation of Islamic law a primary ele-
ment of their reforms. 3 In emphasizing exclusive divine sovereignty,
however, Reformists often miss the more important point that, by confin-
ing rule to the Divine, they exclude their own political position.
One of the major hurdles for either Reformists or Revivalists to over-
come is a religious acceptance of the modern nation-state.2 The nation-
state itself is the embodiment of a popular sovereignty confined by
restrictive borders and guided by the collective principle that it possesses
the ability to determine its own destiny.25 A nation is thought to encapsu-
late a group of people who share certain characteristics 6.2 2 There is
generally no need for a nation to possess an actual physical boundary,
only a consciousness of shared identity. 7 On the other hand, at its most
basic level, a State could be thought of as a demarcation of territory. A
State's physical territory is generally thought to be the limit of its author-
ity and the boundary of its law.28 As axiomatic as these concepts might
sound to a contemporary-minded person in the modern era, such notions
are in stark contrast to the approach adopted by the Islamic classical le-
gal tradition.
222. See HASAN MOINUDDUN, THE CHARTER OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AMONG ITS MEMBER STATES 18 (1987).
223. See, e.g., TIBI, supra note 143, at 104.
224. See, e.g., HAMID ENAYAT, MODERN ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT (1982); JAMES P.
PISCATORI, ISLAM IN A WORLD OF NATION-STATES (1986); Ann E. Mayer, Religious Law and
Legal Pluralism, 12 CARDoZo L. REV. 1015 (1991).
225. See Michael J. Kelly, Political Downsizing: The Re-Emergence of Self-
Determination, and the Movement Toward Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous States, 47 DRAKE
L. REV. 209, 211 (1999); see also Lloyd N. Cutler, Foreword to MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL.,
SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER, at xi (Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace 1992).
226. See Kelly, supra note 225, at 213.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 212.
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At its purest conceptual level, Islamic political science views the
nation-state very differently from its Western counterpart. Islamic political
science removes the notion of an active polity to decide the laws, where
instead God alone has law-making authority.229 While a nation-state sees
all law as originating in the law-making organs of the State, in Islam the
law derives its status as such from being traced to God's command.
Consequently, the impression with which classical Islamic law leaves us
is that the law places severe limits on the power of the State. Rights
pertain either to individuals or to God, but not to the State. Thus, the
State may never be a party to a dispute or assert any claim of its own.
When a Muslim pays taxes or serves in the military, this legal orientation
suggests that he is fulfilling an obligation to God, not to the State. 30 An
Islamic State is only needed to secure the Islamic social order. A
government that knows the limits of its authority can best realize this
goal.
Of course, like in all realms of law, the fact that Islam and the
nation state embrace contradictory theories of popular or legal
sovereignty does not mean that the two systems must inevitably
come into conflict, but often in seeking to live in compliance
with the law, there remain difficult legal obstacles.23'
While Islam and the conceptual nation-state both emphasize the im-
portance of the law, it is precisely this commonality that serves to
undermine their relationship. Islamic legal scholars and contemporary
political leaders, cognizant of the question of religious legitimacy, have
to come up with a formula to avoid a religio-political clash while simul-
taneously working within the newly devised legal concept that is the
nation-state. One way of accomplishing this has been to reconfigure
classical Islamic law with modern political science concepts. For exam-
ple, Fazlur Rahman, argued that the modern function of legislating could
be soundly linked to the classical construct of ijma.232 According to
229. Abul 'Ala Mawdudi, a Pakistani scholar whose works are read throughout the Mus-
lim world, argues that the political philosophy of Islam is the "very antithesis of secular
Western democracy ... [and] the philosophical foundation of Western democracy is the sover-
eignty of the people." In Islam, however, the polity is founded on the sovereignty of God.
SAYYID ABUL 'ALA MAWDUDI, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 136-37 (Khurshid
Ahmad trans. & ed., 2d ed. 1960). For a brief summary of Mawdudi's life and views, see
Charles J. Adams, Mawdudi and the Islamic State, in VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM, supra
note 133, at 99, 99-133.
230. See Adams, supra note 229, at 115-17.
231. At a theoretical level, the Islamic concept of the doctrine of ikhtilaf (or diversity of
doctrine) provides a basis for law to accept other legal doctrine. See N.J. COULSON, A His-
TORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 86-89, 102 (Edinburgh Univ. Press 1964).
232. See Fazlur Rahman, The Islamic Concept of State, in ISLAM IN TRANSITION: MUS-
LIMS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 150, at 261, 262-63.
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Rahman, the concept of consensus would allow legislative variety. He
claimed that changing the law was no more novel than changing the di-
rection of consensus generally.233 Despite creative attempts to inculcate
modern concepts with, arguably, their Islamic law-based analogues,
more success has been found in bifurcating authority and wresting away
authority in matters deemed to be the concern of family.
Another way in which many political theorists and legal scholars
have attempted to reconcile these difficult theoretical problems of relig-
ion and the emergence of the nation-state is to confine Islamic law to
issues relating to family law. Family law is thought to encompass the
laws of domestic relations.3  In fact, many aspects of Muslims' life, in-
cluding their views on the education of women, are found in family law.
Family law, which includes such important areas as marriage,
divorce, and succession has enjoyed a pride of place within the
Shariah, a prominence which reflects the Quranic concern for
the rights of women and the family. Thus, the traditional family
social structure as well as the roles and responsibilities of its
members and family values may be identified in the law.235
One might come away concluding that Islamic family law properly
entertains fidelity to its classical antecedents. However, this is not always
the case. While some of the more superficial legal aspects touch on clas-
sical legal creations, laden throughout most of Islamic family "law" is
the sporadic role of cultural practices. In fact, it has been properly noted
that for many Muslims the distinction between a creature of culture and
a construct based on Islamic law may not be evident. Thus, in examining
much of the family relationships that predominate the Islamic world, one
finds effusive examples of male-based authoritarianism. 236 Even more
troubling is the wholesale exclusion of women from education and, more
specifically, education about the general fundamentals of the law.237 The
233. Id. at 262-63.
234. For a sense of how this area of law might be described as diffuse, see Carl E.
Schneider, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization and Theory in American Family Law, 18
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1039, 1041 (1985).
235. ESPOSITO, supra note 3, at 12.
236. See AI-Hibri, supra note 119, at 5.
237. See infra Section VI.B.
To critically examine patriarchal Islamic jurisprudence from within the tradition, a
woman must be familiar with the logic of usul al-fiqih (Islamic jurisprudence and its
basic principles of reasoning). This requirement is difficult to satisfy because over
the centuries patriarchy has drastically reduced women's access to the arena of
Islamic jurisprudence despite the women's early involvement and contribution to it.
Consequently, the demand for the education of women, particularly in the area of
religious studies, is critical.
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discussion about whether today's Islamic law is actually loyal to the
classical tradition in this regard, as well as the participation of women in
the formulation of the law, will resurface in Part VI.
In order to avoid upsetting the delicate balance between a politically
viable nation-state and an arguably antithetical political philosophy,
Islamic States have had to carve out areas of influence between religious
authority and State-based authority. If this were the end of discussion,
perhaps little more would need to be said about the State. However,
assertions of exclusive authority have not only been challenged by State-
based authorities, but also by an authority that extends beyond State
boundaries-international law. Consequently, it soon became evident
that even if States were willing to delegate authority over areas
traditionally thought best to fit within the realm of religious law,
international actors would continuously exert influence. Once in this
position, Islamic States would not only need to account for their legal
positions, but also defend such positions to a non-Muslim audience.23
Islamic law would have to contend not only with the notion of the
secular nation-state, but also deal with how that nation-state conception
could conform to an even broader framework of nations, most of which
were not Islamic and many of which were not entirely empathetic to
Islamic notions of legal and social relativism. Thus, it is the discussion
of an Islamic international law that presents the next major
contemporary challenge to classical Islamic law.
B. Islam and International Law
After carefully evaluating both the Reformist and Revivalist para-
digms of Islamic law and how they can often lead to diametrical results,
it becomes equally necessary to explore each paradigm's practical ef-
fects. Undoubtedly, there are many areas of substantive law that could be
analyzed in order to examine the manifestations of either paradigm. Yet,
international law poses a unique field of study. The selection of interna-
tional law for this study is motivated in part by the fact that the realm of
public international law itself is a novel legal establishment created
without taking into account Islamic States generally, and in part because
modern international law is the most likely arena where religio-legal jus-
tifications are likely to be tested. Thus, it is crucial for Islamic legal
scholars to implicitly find some level of compatibility in their posi-
tions." '
Al-Hibri, supra note 119, at 5-6.
238. See Westbrook, supra note 10, at 832-33.
239. See generally Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A
Clash of Cultures or a Clash With a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994).
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At the outset it is important to note that there is an active political
resistance to modern public international law for reasons that have little
to do with religion per se.240 During the nineteenth century, Europe
embarked on a mission to "civilize" the Islamic world. Within one
hundred years, through the "triumph" of colonialism, all of Muslim
Africa and most of the Islamic lands of Central and South Asia were
under European control. With the dawn of the twentieth century, some
1,300 years after the Prophet's death, Islam existed under the aegis of
nation-states rather than empires.21' After World War I, the Muslim States
of Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia were created by the intentional
breakup of the Ottoman Empire. European powers, through the process
of decolonization, gave birth to numerous other Islamic nation-states as
well. 42 For all of the faith placed in the concept of nation-states,
however, the European system committed two blunders First, little
attention was paid to the different peoples who would have to live
together in these new political entities. Second, the basic concept of a
Western nation-state flew in the face of Islamic tradition, which stressed
a collective identity based on Islam.243 Consequently, every Islamic State
not only had to contend with the conception of Statehood itself, but also
deal with a system of rules and obligations created by the dominant
244European powers.
As shall be seen, modern international law and the Islamic concep-
tion of international law are facially incompatible. Nevertheless, greater
240. See Esposito, supra note 14, at 26. Esposito explains:
Few took seriously or resolved the relationship of religious culture and [S]tate
ideology. Somehow it was hoped that religion would just recede into private life.
Neither rulers nor Western-oriented elites faced those issues. The fact is that the
modern nation state has failed in many ways. The crises that generated
contemporary Islamic revivalism in newly modernizing [S]tates occurred because
after several decades, Western models of development were not working. Many
concluded "the IS]tate isn't turning out to be what we thought it would be, we're
not getting the benefits that we thought we would get."
Id.
241. See RUTHVEN, supra note 44, at 289-92, 298.
242. See Esposrro, THE ISLAMIC THREAT, supra note 133, at 75, 193.
243. See LAWRENCEz DAVIDSON, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 12 (1998).
244. Consider the following:
If you remember nothing else, remember the following: [Wihile most Muslim
countries gained their political independence a short time ago, today they are en-
gaged in struggles or wars of cultural identity; they did not face the issue of cultural
identity when they gained independence. When we talk about the future of Islam,
we have to see it within that sense that we are talking about a 40- or 50-year period,
which has had a tremendous impact in terms of today.
Esposito, supra note 14, at 25.
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compatibility can be found once one removes the historically based ani-
mus that exists in many of the constructs of the law.
1. The Unfortunate Effect of Militancy and
Its Contemporary Rejection
When a Muslim writes of international law, they write in response to
established Western norms. Often the West is disinterested in the Islamic
response."5 David Westbrook, one of the few scholars who have put forth
a study of Islamic international law (al-siyar), concluded that interna-
tional law is a concept that "Islam needs to account for, respond to,
explain, or make useless.' 2 46 For the classical Islamic scholar, modern
public international law is foreign. "The siyar cannot be said to be com-
patible with the modern international jurisprudence with respect to treaty
principles, customary law, precedent or even the teachings of eminent
publicists., 47 "As a consequence, the authority of public (modern) inter-
national law over Muslims, its legal quality, is inherently problematic.""24
These problems, however, do not necessarily stem from a broad exami-
nation of religious belief. Rather, they are the consequence of a narrow
view of history. It is through an examination of the concert of religion,
religious society, and contemporary political institutions that we can ar-
gue for the demise of al-siyar doctrine.
Islam, as a religion, prevailed not only through the dissemination of
a message ending polytheism. Its success was made resolute through
vigorous military opposition. 24 '9 Despite a religious resistance to war
generally, Islam was born in the midst of war and much of the bellicosity
surrounding the birth of Islam permeated its religious world view. Islam
was born during the decline of Byzantium and Persia, each of which
spent much of their precious resources at war with one another.5 On a
microcosmic level, the ascent of both the Prophet Muhammad and Islam
was met with hostile tribal warfare. Rather than becoming involved in an
ideological contest, the Prophet's opponents opted for militant
extermination in an attempt to silence the message.25 ' The hijira, the
monumental event which begins the Islamic calendar, is not merely the
245. In matters of international law, Muslims often take a defensive or almost regressive
stance; an "apologetic preoccupation" rather than a proactive position. Westbrook, supra note
10, at 833. See generally ERVIN l.J. ROSENTHAL, ISLAM IN THE MODERN NATIONAL STATE
(1965).
246. Westbrook, supra note 10, at 834.
247. Christopher A. Ford, Siyar-ization and its Discontents: International Law and
Islan's Constitutional Crisis, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 499, 500 (1995).
248. Westbrook, supra note 10, at 834.
249. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 138, at 142.
250. See id.
251. See id.; see also GLASS9, supra note 20, at 280-81; MILLER, supra note 146, at 90.
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date which marks the Prophet's departure from Mecca, but, more
important, the military expulsion of early Islam.252 It was only through a
bloodless invasion of Mecca that the Prophet could assure a halt to
hostility against the Faith. The Prophet's migration marked a turning
point in Islam's dealings with other religions. 25' After the Prophet's
death, both the message and militancy continued. Many Islamic
conquests were admittedly aggressive and expanded the reach of the
empire. Soon Islam encountered, and in some cases dominated other
faiths.2 ' The Islamic realm expanded against a multiplicity of foes and
the need for unity within the growing empire was essential. Thus, the
import of Islam was often viewed through the lens of militancy rather
than religiosity. However fortunate this formula might have been for the
preservation of Islam, it is this early reliance on militancy that
predominates and infects classical Islamic law's view of international
law.25 The need for an Islamic international law did not become readily
apparent for a century after the Prophet's death."' The emphasis on
militancy and the desire for unity within the Islamic empire was not lost
on the mujithads who formulated the Schools of Law. Accordingly, a
paradigm of militancy predominated classical Islamic law, despite a
textual ambivalence to the idea of constant war.257
252. See EsposTo, THE ISLAMIC THREAT, supra note 133, at 29.
253. In particular, the Prophet had to deal with early Muslims as well as native Jewish
tribes. See AN-NAI'AM, supra note 138, at 141-49; see also MONTGOMERY WATT, MUHAM-
MAD AT MEDINA 221-25 (1956).
254. In one hundred short years, Islam had built a magnificent, but deeply divided em-
pire. By the time of the Prophet's death in 632 C.E., all of Arabia was under the control of
Islam. In 637 C.E., Islam expanded and Muslims took over the Persian capital of Ctesiphon. In
638 C.E., parts of Byzantium collapsed following the Battle of Yarmouk and the Muslims en-
tered Palestine. The Muslims continued their conquest of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq until it was
completed in 641 C.E. Additionally, Islam spread into Egypt. The Catholic Archbishop invited
the Muslims to help free Egypt from Roman oppressors. This exemplified the alliances formed
between Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Egypt, Persia and the Fertile Crescent were ruled by
the four Rightly Guided Caliphs until 662 c.E.; later these regions were ruled by the Umayyad
dynasty. By 651 C.E., the entire Persian realm came tinder the rule of Islam as it continued its
westward expansion. At the same time, the Muslim conquest reached Morocco in North Af-
rica. By 711 C.E., Muslims began the conquest of Sindh in Afghanistan. By 718 C.E., almost
the entire Iberian Peninsula was under Islamic control. In 732 C.E., at the Battle of Poitiers,
Islamic expansion was halted in France, but continued into parts of Asia and Africa. See gen-
erally THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM (John Esposito ed., 2000).
255. Empirical evidence of this pervasive militant mindset can be found in early mu-
jithads' classification of the entire realm of foreign affairs under the rubric ofjihad. GLASSt,
supra note 20, at 209-10.
256. See William Samuel Dickson Cravens, Note, The Future of Islamic Legal Argu-
ments in International Boundary Disputes Between Islamic States, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
529, 536-39 (1998).
257. See, e.g., THE KORAN, supra note 5, at 2:190, 9:5, 9:12-13, 9:29, 9:36, and 9:73.
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Classical era jurists created what would best be termed an "enabling
doctrine" to permit a continued conflict with non-believers. This doctrine
is known as the doctrine of dar al-islam/dar al-harb.258 According to this
doctrine, the world is divided into two spheres: the dar al-islam (abode
of peace) 29 and the dar al-harb (abode of war).' The latter was thought
to be territory dominated by unbelievers"' and the former included areas
where Islam ruled. This construct then led to the creation of a corpus of
law dedicated to jihad. The fiction of dar al-islam/dar al-harb, alongside
the legal mechanics of jihad, is the animating force behind the classical
Islamic concept of international law, known as al-siyar. Since classical
Islamic law professed the true definition of internationalism as confined
to the operation of war and peace, classical Islamic international law op-
erated on a jus ad bellum standard."'
Today, every Islamic society belongs to nation-states that are part of
a global political and economic system. They are members of the United
Nations and subject to modern international law.2 63 None of these nation-
states is religiously homogeneous, politically insulated, or economically
independent from the non-Muslim world. Ostensibly, wealthy, purely
Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia are, in fact, vulnerable to economic,
security, technological, or other forms of dependency on non-Muslim
parts of the world. The question then arises, whether, in the postcolonial
era, the doctrine of al-siyar still possesses any of its religious or political
salience. However, rather than concede that history has already answered
this question, it is important as a matter of law to deconstruct classical
258. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS XXi
(1993).
259. See GLASSf, supra note 20, at 93.
260. It should be noted that the geographic and religious distinctions of the dar al-
islam/dar al-harb have been slightly modified over time. Some have defined these terms so as
to allow Muslims governed by Islamic law, even if they reside under the political dominance
of non-Muslims, to remain in the realm of the dar al-islam. One particularly salient example
of this was the British control of India. However, the premise of an inviolable distinction be-
tween believers and non-believers remains. See MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE
LAw OF ISLAM 156-57 (1979).
261. The bifurcation of the world on religious terms is not a novel concept, nor is it con-
fined to Islam. See generally JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, THE HOLY WAR IDEA IN WESTERN AND
ISLAMIC TRADITIONS (1997) (discussing how the Augustinian division between civitas terrenae
(earthly city) and civitas dei (city of God) compares with the Islamic concept of dar al-harb
and dar al-islam).
262. Ann E. Mayer, War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition of International Law, in
JUST WAR AND JIHAD 195, 197 (John Kelsay & James Turner Johnson eds., 1991). But see
MOINUDDUN, supra note 222 (discussing an emphatic rejection of thejus ad bellum stance of
Islamic law).
263. It should be noted that, recently, Asian countries have been the strongest advocates
of the position that human rights are not universal. Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human
Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural
Contexts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740, 743 (1994).
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Islamic international law in order to ferret out both the doctrine's limits
and strengths, especially in light of the repeated calls by Revivalists for a
strict adherence to Islamic law.
To recall, under the classical doctrine of al-siyar, the world is neatly
bifurcated between realms of belief and non-belief. The rationale for such
a distinction is that those living within the realm of believers exist on a
significantly advantageous religious plane compared to those who do not.
Consequently, there is a constant political and religious preoccupation
with trying to make the world more advantageous for Muslims. As a mat-
ter of religion, the animating feature behind the dar al-islam/dar al-harb
distinction rests with the empirical notion that a dar al-islam exists, or at
one time existed. In response, first, one could dismiss the animating fea-
tures of al-siyar, the dar al-harbidar al-islam distinction, by pointing out
that the Qur'an itself does not mandate this division of the world." Sec-
ond, in response to claims that the al-siyar doctrine is the natural
consequence of religion and religious history, one would likely find the
legitimacy of the doctrine of al-siyar largely undermined by the very
same concert of religious belief and religious history.
Islam, unlike other universalistic faiths such as Christianity, actually
codified the idea of religious and social coexistence. 265 Although Islam
maintained an ideological leadership role for itself, it was not intended
as means of social or military repression. Instead, this assertion of lead-
ership was maintained as a default position, as faiths like Christianity
made no mention of peaceful religious coexistence. In fact, the Qur'an
actually discourages Muslims from declaring a self-righteous preemi-
nence over others, especially in matters of religion. Thus, there is no
reason to suppose that Qur'anic reprimands to other religious communi-
ties would, or should not be applied to the Islamic community. "That is a
community that is bygone; to them belongs what they earned and to you
belongs what you earn, and you will not be asked about what they had
done."2  In fact, Islamic law recognizes the sovereign equality of Muslim
and non-Muslim States.267 Specifically, within Islamic law, sovereign
264. See HALLAQ, supra note 42, at 236; see also THE KORAN, supra note 5, at 11:120
("Had your Lord pleased, He would have united all mankind. They are still at odds, except for
those to whom your Lord has shown mercy."). But see THE KORAN, supra note 5, at 2:62;
3:28, 85, 91, 118, 188; 4:56, 74, 76, 89, 140, 144, 150-151; 5:10, 51, 69, 82, 86; 7:36; 8:12,
28, 39-42; 9:5-6, 23, 29, 38-39; 10:4; 17:10; 22:19-22; 44:43-58; 46:4; 72:23; 48:16; and
98:6.
265. See, e.g., THE KORAN, supra note 5, at 2:62; 29:46.
266. Id. at 2:134.
267. See Sarvenoz Bahar, Khomeinism, The Islamic Republic of Iran, and International
Law: The Relevance of Islamic Political Ideology, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 145, 190 (1992).
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equality has been described as "no [external] power ... enforce[ing] its
will upon an independent sovereign.'268
In addition, religious history and human experience reveal that the
separate realms of war and peace have never existed since the time of the
Prophet. Recall that the Prophet made Medina the capital of the Islamic
community and, in due course, that the city began to acquire the charac-
teristics of a State. As time went on, the tiny city-state burgeoned into a
well-organized government with its own sources of revenue, its own
treasury, its own army, its own system of justice, and its own administra-
tive and diplomatic apparatus.2 69 After the death of the Prophet, the
infighting began. Three of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs were mur-
dered. Soon thereafter, the religious split between the Sunnis and Shiites
occurred . 7 Within Islam came the wholesale rejection of the Mu'tazilite
insistence on quasi rationalism, which rose to the domination of an insu-
lar form of Islamic law, making religious dissent more difficult.27' Even
under the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the political dimensions of the umma
changed. The subsequent Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties were actual
contenders, not allies. In essence, the People of the Faith could no
more reconcile Islam with themselves, let alone act as a unified force
against other faiths.
Consequently, when the Prophet Muhammad died in 632 C.E., the
collective religio-political umma for which the Revivalists clamored in
their insistence that Islamic law be fully adopted actually died with the
Prophet. Thus, when evaluated in light of history, the idea of the dar al-
islam reveals little empirical advantage for Muslims, at least in a politi-
cal sense. The shortcomings of the dar al-islam call into question
whether the dar al-harb is truly an abode of war. Thus, the totality of
circumstances regarding this doctrine actually undermines the justifica-
tion that the al-siyar should take ajus ad bellum approach.
268. MUHAMMAD HAMIDULLAH, MUSLIM CONDUCT OF THE STATE 126 (1977).
Hamidullah clarifies that " ... it is the right of a State to administer all of its internal and ex-
ternal affairs in such a way that it is neither controlled nor interfered with by a foreign power."
Id.; see also THE KORAN, supra note 5, at 3:26 ("Lord, Sovereign of all sovereignty, You be-
stow sovereignty on whom You will and take it away from whom You please! You exalt
whomever You will and abase whomever You please.").
269. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Protection of Diplomats Under Islamic Law, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 609, 610 (1980).
270. See VIORST, supra note 1, at 147.
271. See id. at 151-57.
272. See id.
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2. Renewing Islamic Law's Resonance
with International Law
As a matter of religion, society, and nationhood itself, the dar al-
islam and dar al-harb have little credibility in the modern context. There
are, in fact, ways in which classical concepts may find resonance in
modern international law.273 While Islamic States have made strides in
accepting international law, they have not given their full assent on a re-
ligio-philosophical-legal level.
Muslim [S]tates have accommodated themselves to the prevail-
ing international norms while stopping short of assimilating
them into Islamic political or legal theory. In other words, al-
though they have committed themselves to the principles of
international law, there has yet to occur a theoretical incorpora-
tion of these principles into a coherent and modern elaboration
of Islamic international law.274
Thus, armed with religiously plausible arguments that defeat notions
of fearing "the other"-a notion that predominated most of Islamic his-
tory-Islamic States can reap the advantages of both advancing the social
and political progress of humanity as well as advancing their own political
self-interests. Islamic States should be motivated to religiously accept
modern public international law by removing religious and doctrinal hin-
drances that usually stand between them and other States. Islamic States
are best suited to meet the challenges posed by their own political and so-
cial considerations, especially in the wake of modernity. In addition,
through the acceptance of international law, Islamic States can advance the
entire field for the benefit of humanity, while at the same time implanting
the distinctive qualities of Islamic States. The fundamental purpose and
function of modem international law is the regulation of the relationship
between all of the members of the international community according to
the principles of equality and justice, and the promotion of peace among
those States and their respective subjects.275
Although scholars such as Westbrook point to a lack of established in-
ternational law, these scholars fail to recognize that Islamic law is
inherently international.2 7 Hasan Moinuddun, conducting a study of inter-
national Islamic organizations, concluded that Islamic international law
273. See Chase, supra note 129, at 385 (arguing that, broadly speaking, Islamic law and
modern public international law are compatible).
274. Sohail H. Hashmi, The Power of Religion in International Society and its Islamic
Malcontents, 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 13, 18 (Spring 1996).
275. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 138, at 3.
276. See Cravens, supra note 256, at 542-44.
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has a common juridical background.277 In addition, one must be cognizant
of the fact that, even at a superficial level, Islamic law occupies a superla-
tive position in the legal arena of many States and functions much like a
modem international framework. Within this larger framework, one
finds resonant concepts of jus cogens and preemptory norms derived
from the Qur'an and Islamic law. Thus, despite present definitional
shortcomings, it is difficult to call Islamic law anything but compatible
with international law.
After examining the tenets which make up the classical Islamic legal
tradition, one finds that "Islamic" concepts and "international" concepts
have much in common. Overarching much of this discussion is a basic
tenet that Islamic States follow in the Christian conviction of Grotius.
That is, their authority is in some ways derived from God and, therefore,
Islamic States should implicitly be cognizant of their religious obliga-
tions when they attach their signatures to international agreements.279 On
a more human level, one litmus test of international legal compatibility is
found in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ Statute). Article 38 argues that the sources of law for international
legal considerations shall apply in the following situations:
(a) International conventions whether general or particular, estab-
lishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) International custom, as evidence if a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
(c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) Subject to provisions of Article 59, judicial provisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the vari-
ous nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the
rules of law.
21
One constant in the international legal process is the concept of
pacta sunt servanda-the obligation that treaties be fulfilled. The
Islamic response is that "[t]he principle of pacta sunt servanda is
recognized by all Muslim jurist-theologians. 28 ' In fact, according to the
277. See MOINUDDUN, supra note 222, at 18.
278. See infra Appendix (detailing the legal systems of the various members of the Or-
ganization of the Islamic Conference).
279. See generally Mark Janis, American Versions of the International Law of Christen-
dom: Kent, Wheaton and the Grotian Tradition, 39 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 37 (1992).
280. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993.
281. MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 204 (AMS Press 1979)
(1955).
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Qur'an, treaty obligations are a part of the Divine mandate, and may
even be used to supercede agreements with fellow Muslim communities.
"But if they seek your help in the cause of the true Faith, it is your duty
to assist them, except against a people with whom you have a treaty.
' 282
Religious compliance with a treaty eclipses temporary "State" arrange-
ments of mutual convenience. Consequently, there is a stronger moral
force for self-proclaimed Islamic States to adhere to treaty obligations,
even if the underlying substantive law proves less than Divine.283 More
importantly, proof of bona fide and purely Islamic efforts to uphold an
international treaty is found in the standard set forth by the Treaty of
Hudaybiya.2 4 This treaty between the Prophet Muhammad and the
idolatrous tribes of Mecca was aimed at achieving a truce between the
warring sides.285 Even after repeated breaches by the Meccans,
Muhammad's entry into Mecca came without incident. The Treaty of
Hudaybiya offers two important points of consideration. First, the treaty,
at that time, was in fact an international treaty of peace between Muslims
and some of the more aggressive tribes of Arabia. Second, although a
military reprisal was justified under the terms set forth in the treaty, an
extreme counterresponse never materialized.288
Additionally, Islamic law has implicitly accepted the powerful role
of custom in framing legal standards. Both the international necessity of
using custom to expound upon treaty obligations, as well as the Islamic
necessity of using the Prophet's custom to expound upon Islamic legal
principles, signals, at some basic level, a common appreciation for the
implicit legal authority not found in either a particular treaty or in the
Qur'an. Such a common reliance on agreed-upon reference points sug-
gests an implicit willingness by both international law and classical
Islamic law to use sources and methodologies that expand the rubric of
the law. One perhaps simplistic example in international law is the reli-
ance on the Vienna Convention on Treaties to expound upon the meaning
of article 38 of the ICJ Statute. In Islamic law, one finds an analogous
concept in the Treaty of Hudaybiya, where the Qur'an serves to explicate
the meaning of that treaty's text. Even the distinction between jus co-
gens, a more historical and natural law, and customary law, a common
conventional law, finds a mirror image of the history replicated in the
Sunnah and the conventions endorsed by the Qur'an. In addition, there
has been an increasing international legal consciousness among Islamic
282. THE KORAN, supra note 5, at 8:72.
283. See, e.g., MOINUDDUN, supra note 222, at 48.
284. See id. at 49. The caliph has always retained the authority to enter into treaty ar-
rangements for the Islamic State. See Bassiouni, supra note 269, at 610.
285. See Bassiouni, supra note 269, at 611-12; see also WATT, supra note 253.
286. See Ford, supra note 247, at 519.
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States. Specifically, the formulation of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), as well as the concomitant formulation of the Islamic
International Law Commission (IILC) resonates with the notion of a
growing international consciousness.
The OIC Charter contains two important international concepts 
287
First, the parties to the Charter recognize the legitimacy of international
boundaries, and more importantly, through their implicit recognition of
nation-states as legitimate legal actors in the international arena, the
Charter acts as an empirical rejection of the classical doctrine of the dar
al-harb/dar al-islam within the al-siyar. Second, the Charter's language
closely resembles a Western notion of the nation-state and, as such, can
be seen as persuasive indication of an Islamic willingness and capability
to participate in the wider scope of international affairs.
To conclude, a new era of international law will follow when Islamic
States can fully reject, at a religious level, the dar al-islam/dar al-harb
distinction. For Islamic international law to continue its move toward full
compatibility with modern international law, however, Reformists must
defeat Revivalist attempts to masquerade social reforms that are essen-
tially inconsistent with the classical tradition for tolerance within Islam.
Reforms of the domestic Islamic law require that Islamic international
law must take aim at larger considerations. In order to be faithful to the
spirit, rather than the letter of classical Islamic law, novel Islamic inter-
national paradigms must be expansionary and malleable in order to
allow new legal doctrines to reflect future exigencies. These exigencies
require Islam-derived international decrees to take into account all rele-
vant socio-economic conditions before consenting to any general,
binding principles.288
287. See CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, at
http://www.oic-un.org/about/Charter.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2002).
288. Although the process set forth is admittedly vague, there is a further catalyst: the
full-fledged institution of democracy. By accepting the premise that Islamic law is defined
heavily by juridical constructs, a true revolution must consider popular demands and assent to
all-encompassing restrictions. As a result, Reformists must place a premium on educational
reform so that legitimate democracy can take over the process. Until there is self-sufficient
democracy, international law can play an important role in forcing the continued evolution of
Islamic law. One could argue that any articulation of the Qur'an must stand firm and not be
compromised by either the Sunnah or an obscure lingual context requiring that principles be
drawn from purely Qur'anic textual references. Additionally, the application of religious law
must look at the progression of the Qur'an in its entirety. Although, at first glance, this conten-
tion seems identical to the previous principle, it actually forces scholars to square the
development of concepts in the entire legal corpus, not just the rigidity of choice phrases.
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VI. WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE CLASH OF IDEOLOGIES
The fate of Islamic law will largely be determined by how it is char-
acterized. Accordingly, whether this characterization is made by
Reformists or Revivalists is extremely important. Both contemporary
ideologies have become particularly interested in the rights of women
and the way in which the classical Islamic legal tradition has dealt with
those rights as compared to the treatment accorded to women by modern
international law.
In a study of Islamic law's struggle with women's rights, one must
consider three areas of discussion. First, in the formation of classical
Islamic law, there appears to be a vast divide between the Qur'anic spirit
and the actual form of the law. Second, it is important to examine how
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) resolutely articulated international legal
standards for the rights of women. Third, one must understand how
Islamic States have "Islamically" reconfigured their domestic legal struc-
tures specifically to comply with international legal standards and how
they have articulated their version of human rights more generally. While
Reformists have had some success in religiously reconfiguring Islamic
law though the external dialectic of international law, real success in
overhauling women's status under Islamic law can only be realized when
women themselves are thoroughly involved in shaping the legal and
ethical considerations which affect them the most.
Both because of the contemporary criticism of Islam's treatment of
women, and a general portrayal of Islamic law as debasing the rights of
women, it is important to take into account the role that Islam played in
revolutionizing the status of women.289 Islam was the most progressive
religion in the Near East. The Qur'an banned female infanticide; granted
women the right to inherit,290 to divorce and to maintain their dowries;
and slowed polygamy in the Arabian Peninsula. In Islam, women and
men are subject to the same religious obligations such as prayer, fasting,
and a pilgrimage to Mecca. In addition, under Islamic law, a woman's
right to own property is just as absolute as a man's. 29 ' Male kin cannot
289. "Islam was the first religion to honor the woman and the first religion to outline
legislation to stipulate that women should be treated as an independent human entity." Report
of the Round Table Workshop: CEDAW and Islam and the Human Rights of Women, UNITED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR WOMEN, Oct. 1999, at www.arabwomenconnect.org/
english/western-asia/round-report.html.
290. See, e.g., Zainab Chaudhry, Comment, The Myth of Misogyny: A Reanalysis of
Wonen's Inheritance in Islanic Law, 61 ALB. L. REV. 511, 516 (1997) (giving women the
right to inherit is well recognized "as one of the most significant aspects of the Islamic law
291. See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 24, at 327.
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handle a woman's financial interests without her permission.2 2 A woman
must specifically consent to marriage and cannot be forced to accept a
husband she does not want.293 'In cases of divorce, women have exclusive
guardianship rights over children until they reach puberty, an important
departure from past practice. Most importantly, Islam overturned tradi-
tion by according women equal religious status before God. No longer
were women denied their humanity. Their souls, like the souls of men,
were precious to God. In addition, women, like men, were deemed wor-
thy of dignity and respect. 294 As a result of this new status and the
revolution it worked on Arab communities, women became pillars of
early Muslim society. Accordingly, it was not the spirit of the Qur' an that
subjugated women to men, but the will of society.
With regard to the Sunnah and subsequent history, the Prophet's
treatment of women in marriage, specifically his relationship with his
first wife, Khadijah, has been glorified as the ideal marriage. Contrary to
the tradition of polygamy that prevailed at the time in Arabia, the
Prophet Muhammad remained a faithful and devoted husband. Khadijah
was, in fact, Muhammad's first convert to Islam and his strongest sup-
porter in the struggle to establish the new faith. Several women, notably
Fatima-daughter of the Prophet Muhammad and wife of Ali, the fourth
of the Rightly Guided Caliphs-played important roles in the propaga-
tion of the faith.2 95 Additionally, A'isha, a later wife of the Prophet, was
noted for her education and intelligence, and she was often consulted
about the teachings of the Prophet after his death.296 A'isha also became
the modern-day equivalent of a military general, and actively opposed
the succession of Ali as caliph upon the death of Caliph Uthman. As one
author put it, "[lt]here is no greater scholar than A'isha in the learning of
the Koran, obligatory duties, lawful and unlawful matters, poetry and
literature, Arab history and genealogy."
297
In spite of the above-described historical tradition, the spirit of eq-
uity never fully crystallized under Islamic law. Much of the progressive
momentum of Islam died with the Prophet. For the vast majority of reli-
gious scholars, where the Qur'an gave no more, they gave no further.
This relationship of inequity remains to the present day.
292. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 79 (1991).
293. See Sayeh & Morse, supra note 24, at 326-27.
294. See id. at 321.
295. To Shi'a Muslims, Fatima is actually revered as an authoritative source of the
Prophet's sayings and deeds.
296. A'isha was so well regarded in matters of faith that the Prophet told Muslims to
"take half [their] religion from this woman." GERALDINE BROOKS, NINE PARTS OF DESIRE:
THE HIDDEN WORLD OF ISLAMIC WOMEN 85 (1995).
297. JAN GOODWIN, PRICE OF HONOR: MUSLIM WOMEN LIFT THE VEIL OF SILENCE ON
THE ISLAMIC WORLD 42 (1994).
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The Islamic woman appears to be the very object now that she
was hundreds of years ago, with little personal power
independent of the men in her life. Men and women in Islamic
society are not treated as equals; rather women are persons
whose status is derived from the men in her life. Those male
figures include, but are not limited to, her father and her
husband. An Islamic marriage follows the traditional contract
theory of marriage: an offer, an acceptance, and consideration
(dower). There must also be marital equality, and no
impediments to the marriage. Most Islamic sects perceive
marital equality to be through lineage, freedom from defects,
religious piety, and property."'
Despite the Qur'anic impetus and subsequent history offered above,
women's rights under Islam have essentially been shackled by the con-
fines of culture and made so intertwined in the mind of classical jurists
that, suddenly, cultural practices possessed the seal of religious law. One
reason for the continued codification of such cultural practices was the
near absence of women jurists.299 Unlike the earlier discussion about Is-
lamic international law, where one could utilize changing legal and
social apparatus to alter its present religious validity, one finds that
women's rights under Islam have suffered so greatly from the heavy
hand of culture that it is extremely difficult for Reformists to find valid
alternative religious constructs without causing great internal strife. Ad-
ditionally, one could conclude that, as a matter of Islamic law, the
subject of women's rights will likely be the most difficult challenge for
Reformists, and the arena in which Revivalists are likely to be the most
adamant. Although far from an impossible task, Reformists may need the
aid of international institutions, as well as the help of women themselves
to force Islamic States to reconsider their Islamic legal positions.
A. The External Dialectic: International Law
and the Rights of Women
International law and the persistence of many of its actors has helped
persuade, and, at times, perhaps force Islamic States to reexamine their
laws related to women. In 1967, the United Nations promulgated the
Declaration on Women (the Women's Declaration), which essentially
offered the world the "definitive international legal instrument requiring
298. JAMAL J. NASIR, THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND UNDER MOD-
ERN ISLAMIC LEGISLATION (2d ed. 1994).
299. See al-Hibri, supra note 119, at 6-7.
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respect for the observance of the human rights of women."3° However, it
was the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) that sought to eradicate har-
assment against women and to promote equality among the sexes in their
social and legal rights:
The Convention provides the basis for realizing equality be-
tween women and men through ensuring women's equal access
to, and equal opportunities in, political and public life-
including the right to vote and to stand for election-as well as
education, health and employment. In turn, [S]tates [P]arties
agreed to take all appropriate measures, including legislation and
temporary special measures, so that women can enjoy all their
human rights and fundamental freedoms.'
The Convention's ambitious agenda gained widespread popularity,
and, unlike past considerations which dealt with the legal status of
women in international agreements, Muslim States were very attentive to
the Convention's details. This enhanced attention is attributable to both
the language utilized in the Convention and concerns about the Conven-
tion's enforcement. In particular, Islamic States voiced their hostility
toward article 16 of the Treaty, which requires States to end prejudicial
and customary forms of discrimination related to marriage and domestic
relations . 2 Despite a wide disparity of religious opinions, some Islamic
countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, registered reservations
to article 16 predicated on Islamic law.30 3 These Islamic States' thinly
veiled attempts to block international criticism was met by a surprisingly
intense amount of scrutiny. Many States charged that reservations based
on Islamic law were so broad in their scope that they contradicted the
object and purpose of the Convention, thus violating of the Vienna Con-
vention on Treaties .3
300. Rebecca Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643, 643 (1990).
301. G.A. Res. 2263, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6880 (1967), reprinted in I
UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 145
(1993).
302. Id. art. 16, 1249 U.N.T.S. at 20.
303. See Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination: Are the Shari'a and the Convention
Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1960 (1995).
304. Under article 19(a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention, a country can make reserva-
tions to a treaty at the time of signing or ratifying so long as the treaty does not prohibit
formulation of reservations or limit the types of reservations that may be made. Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 1, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333-36 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention]. Mere compliance with these two subsections, however, does not auto-
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A community of nations summarily refused to accept the reserva-
tions as a matter of internal social concerns of Islamic States.3 5 The
same multitude of nations also adroitly addressed concerns about the
unfair intrusiveness of the international community arguing that uphold-
ing international standards was not a question of cultural relativism-
international agreements aim for higher standards. 36 For most of the
global community, it was difficult to accept a reservation like Islamic
law as an excuse to internal reforms. Today, with the fiftieth anniversary
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed and the end of the
Cold War, simple acquiescence to reservations is no longer an acceptable
practice.3 7 The international debate required that Islamic States provide a
clear and legitimate response to the challenges posed by the Convention.
As a consequence of Islamic States' early intransigence and the
fierce criticism of the world community, many Islamic States re-
evaluated the extensiveness of their Islamic law reservation. Because of
early intransigence, at the outset, only five Islamic States had adopted
the treaty by 1981.308 By 1994, however, twelve Islamic States had
ratified the treaty. Importantly, no Islamic State filed a reservation to
article 7 and article 8 dealing with political equality among the sexes.
309
Even more remarkable, Tunisia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have
implemented laws following in the Convention's path. Although by no
means a complete success,30 buoyed by treaty and popular support, some
nations did alter their domestic laws. For example, Tunisia began to
implement a series of women's rights modifications cleverly using
matically render a reservation valid. Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention prohibits reserva-
tions incompatible with a treaty's object and purpose. Id.
305. See generally Venkatraman, supra note 303.
306. Id.
307. Despite thoughtful argument, the notion that cultural relativism should pervade is
not a persuasive argument:
With a coherent philosophy of human rights yet to emerge, the universality of hu-
man rights appears to be the rhetoric of a political project, rather than the
expression of an established fact. This incoherence, however, should not mask the
fact that what might be called a "shifting universality" has, in fact, solidified itself
as people from various perspectives have come to see human rights as the common
language by which their political and social ideals can gain force with general con-
sensus on a number of rights.
Chase, supra note 129, at 383.
308. Id.
309. See Cook, supra note 300.
310. See, e.g., Kathryn Christine Arnold, Are the Perpetrators of Honor Killings Getting
Away with Murder? Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code Analyzed Under the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1343, 1397 (2001) (asserting that Jordan has failed to take affirmative steps to eradicate dis-
crimination against women who are victims of honor killings in violation of CEDAW).
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previously dismissed religious doctrine to justify domestic legal changes.
In particular, Tunisian officials produced redefined Qur'anic principles in
order to adhere to broader Convention provisions. By 1981, Tunisia gave
divorced women the right to a level of maintenance to which they were
accustomed while married, a debt that continues until the husband's
death or until the former wife's economic condition improves.'3 In 1992,
stepping away from the harsh and intransigent policy that women could
not divorce men despite abuse or deprivation, Tunisia modified divorce so
that it cannot be pronounced until after a family magistrate has attempted
to reconcile the spouses. If there are minor children, at least three
reconciliation hearings must be held, no less than thirty days between
each. During divorce proceedings, family magistrates are empowered to
issue orders, when urgent, regarding spousal residences, alimony, custody
of children and visitation rights.3 2 In addition, Tunisia has already
legalized abortion and provides free abortions when performed in public
facilities for those not covered by medical insurance.33 Tunisia's
reinterpretation of Islamic law according to the Hanafi view permitted
abortions before the soul was formed, which is deemed to be up to four
months after conception. ' 4 By 1993, the Tunisian government vowed to
endow women with new rights, including the suppression of domestic
violence.3 '
Some States, likely taking their cue from the treaty language, not
only controverted basic Islamic law, but also controverted well-
established legal principles. For example, CEDAW furthered women's
political rights in articles 7 and 8 by laying down provisions ensuring
311. See Michele Brandt & Jeffrey Kaplan, The Tension Between Women's Rights and
Religious Rights: Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia, 12 J.L. & RE-
LIGION 105, 110-13 (1995-96) (construing the Personal Status Code of Egypt, 1976). The
reformed divorce laws of Tunisia, Iran, Iraq, and South Yemen are more progressive in that
they require the pronouncements of divorce to be made in a court of law. See Noel Coulson &
Doreen Hinchcliffe, Women and Law Reform in Contemporary Islam, in WOMEN IN THE
MUSLIM WORLD 44 (Lois Beck & Nikki Keddie eds., 1978).
312. See Amending Certain Articles of the Personal Status Code, Act No. 93-74, July 12,
1992, art. 67, construed in Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 311, at 129-3 1.
313. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the
Convention: Combined Initial and Second Reports of State Parties-Tunisia, Apr. 12, 1994,
CEDAW/C/TUN/1-2, at 19, construed in Brandt & Kaplan, supra note 311, at 128 n.110
[hereinafter Tunisia Report].
314. See Azizah al-Hibri, Marriage Laws in Muslim Countries: A Comparative Study of
Certain Egyptian, Syrian, Moroccan, and Tunisian Marriage Laws, 4 INT'L REV. COMP. PUB.
POL'Y 227, 240 (1992); see also Azizah Y al-Hibri, Family Planning and Islamic Jurispru-
dence, Address as Part of the Panel on Religious and Ethical Perspectives on Population Issues
Convened by the NGO Steering Committee at Prepcom II of the International Conference
on Population and Development at the United Nations, May 19, 1993, available at
www.religiousconsultatiun.rg/family-planning & Islamicjurisprudence-by-alHibri.htm.
315. See Tunisia Report, supra note 313, at 32.
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that women not only have the right to vote, but also the right to stand for
election in all publicly elected bodies and to hold public office.
Additionally, the right to represent government in the international
sphere is specifically provided for in article 8.31 6 Although no Islamic
States entered a reservation, there was the possibility of conflict between
classical Islamic law and the Convention's provisions. The main source
of prejudice against women in Islamic law entering the political sphere
emanates from a hadith related by Abu Bakr-the Prophet's closest
friend and first caliph. He claimed that when the Prophet Muhammad
was told that a woman leader had been appointed in Persia, he
commented, "A nation will never prosper if it is led by a woman."37
Islamic States summarily rejected that inequitable interpretation of
Islamic law, by essentially denying that the hadith constituted Sunnah.
Specifically, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Pakistan have guaranteed the
franchise to women in politics, with Bangladesh having women retain a
certain number of seats in its parliament. In particular, Bangladesh and
Pakistan have had women at the highest levels of political leadership." '
Although CEDAW represents a powerful example of how
international influence could force Islamic States to reevaluate their legal
principles, and also their domestic laws, it seems only likely that the
most effective way in which to change Islam-based laws is through
Islam-based standards. There is already an implicit Islamic duty under
current international treaties and conventions recognized in religion and
in law to protect women from persecution.39 For most of the debate,
Revivalists have readily challenged the existence and validity of
universal human rights standards.32 These challenges, however, are not
316. See CEDAW, supra note 301, arts. 7, 8.
317. Fatima Mernissi, A Feminist Interpretation of Women's Rights in Islam, in LIBERAL
ISLAM 112, 113-114 (Charles Kurzman ed., 1998).
318. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh and former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto of Pakistan. See Urfan Khaliq, Beyond the Veil?: An Analysis of the Provisions of the
Women's Convention as Stipulated in the Shari'ah, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (1995).
319. See generally Abdullahi An-Na'im, The Rights of Women and International Law in
the Muslim Context, 9 WHITTIER L. REv. 491 (1987).
320. Many Muslims use the concept of cultural relativism to legitimize their adherence
to Islamic law. They contend that it is difficult, if not entirely impossible, to create universal
human rights standards that will apply equally to all members of the global community. Their
position generally suggests that-given the diversity of cultural traditions, political structures,
and levels of development in the world-it is virtually impossible to define a single distinctive
and coherent human rights regime. See Bilhari Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOR-
EIGN POL'Y J. 224, 227 (1993). But see An-Nai'im, supra note 114, at 46-48 (arguing that
Islamic law, in its true form, addresses the fundamentals of human rights, An-Nai'im identifies
the most important human rights principles in Islam to be dignity and brotherhood; equality
among members of the community without regard to race, color, or class; respect for the
honor, reputation, and family of each individual; the right of each individual to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty; and individual freedom). For a tentative exploration into a legiti-
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entirely legal. Instead they largely focus on issues of cultural relativism
and rely largely on the political divide between the Islamic and Western
worlds. Rather than engage human rights on a legal level, Islamic States,
until recently, relied on their jaded political views. Consequently, in a
move that corresponded with the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Islamic world actually began to
articulate Islamic law's stance on human rights generally. In 1990, all of
the nations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference produced the
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam."' The Declaration is
perhaps one of the most unequivocal examples of Islamic international
collectivism, as it is uniquely Islamic and was formulated by every State
within the Organization of the Islamic Conference. "The Cairo
Declaration assumes more general significance than the previous Islamic
human rights schemes because it embodies an approach to rights that has
been endorsed by the foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference." '322
Additionally, the Declaration exemplifies an important aspect of
classical Islamic law-an implicit rejection of the classical antagonism
toward the concept of a nation-state and the acceptance of international-
ism. A review of the Declaration's contents reveals that, facially, it
contains both international and religious aspects. Consequently, the
Declaration's hybridization of Islamic and international standards should
be seen as a positive indication of an Islamic willingness to incorporate
contemporary political concepts into their own legal legacy. At the outset
of the Declaration, international standards are invoked: "[R]eaffirming
their commitment to the [U.N.] Charter and fundamental Human Rights,
the purposes and principles of which provide the basis for fruitful co-
operation amongst all people." '323
In addition, one of the Declaration's critics, Ann Elizabeth Mayer,
conceded the significance of that document in its blending of Islamic and
modern international principles, and as representing a departure from the
recognized canons of Islamic law:
Like other Islamic human rights schemes, the Cairo Declaration
is actually a hybrid of international and Islamic elements. It does
not have an exact counterpart in the Islamic legal legacy. Like
mate "universalization" of universal human rights, see HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nai'im ed., 1992).
321. Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Aug. 5, 1990, reprinted in TWENTY-
FIVE HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (Columbia Univ. Center for the Study of Human Rights
ed., 1994) [hereinafter Cairo Declaration]; U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 4th Sess.,
Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/62/Add. 18 (1993) (English translation).
322. Mayer, supra note 239, at 327.
323. MOINUDDUN, supra note 222, at 186.
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the preceding Islamic human rights schemes, the Cairo Declara-
tion, in formulating its civil and political rights, borrows
extensively from terms and concepts taken from the Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights and combines them with elements
inspired by Islamic law or the authors' conceptions of Islamic
values.324
Moreover, the Declaration explicitly affirms sex equality in areas
where Muslim women are often thought to suffer discrimination. In par-
ticular, the Declaration expressly guarantees equality in the workplace.
One "shall be entitled-without any discrimination between males and
females-to fair wages for his work without delay, as well as to holiday
allowances and promotions which he deserves." '325 The "right to mar-
riage" is guaranteed to both men and women without restrictions.326 The
Declaration also provides protection to children without distinction be-
tween girls and boys. Although the Declaration provides the best
yardstick by which to measure Islamic legal standards when dealing with
human rights, there are significant questions that remain. Specifically,
article 6 enunciates a number of duties which are imposed upon women:
"A woman is equal to man in human dignity and has rights to enjoy as
well as duties to perform; she has her own civil entity and financial inde-
pendence and the rights to retain her name and lineage."'327
Although the arguments proffered against the Declaration do serve
as a basis for future criticism and discussion, there is also an implicit
legal value in possessing such a Declaration. For one, the Declaration
moves beyond the mere invocations of Islamic law, and purports to ar-
ticulate what in fact is Islamic law.328 From this point of view, the
Declaration becomes a means for Western critics to continue charging
that Islamic States simply are not complying with international treaties
in their own right. More importantly, however, it also gives Islamic legal
scholars an opportunity to either challenge, or in some way circumvent,
the religious propositions set forth in the Declaration. The Declaration
could be seen as a sort of modern-day ijma, or at least modernity's most
likely analogue. That being said, the Declaration may offer Islamic
324. Mayer, supra note 239, at 328 (emphasis added).
325. Cairo Declaration, supra note 321, art. 13, at 192.
326. Id. art. 5, at 191. But see ANN E. MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION
AND POLITICS 120 (1991) [hereinafter MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; Mayer, supra
note 239, at 333 (noting that the freedom does not extend to the husband's religious affilia-
tion).
327. Cairo Declaration, supra note 321, art. 6, at 191.
328. The most pervasive qualification to the Declaration is that Islamic law governs all
rights and freedoms stipulated. Some have viewed this negatively. Although The Cairo Decla-
ration is a not the definitive document on human rights and Islam, it moves the religion in the
right direction. See MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 326, at 76-78.
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States a religious cover from Revivalists' continued criticism that State
compliance with international treaty obligations is contrary to Islamic
law. Thus, like the enabling doctrine that characterized the dar al-
islam/dar al-harb distiniction, the Declaration's insistence that human
rights are Islamic in character may further enable more complete com-
pliance with treaty bodies such as CEDAW. In fact, Islamic States,
taking their cue from the Qur'anic example, may be encouraged to be-
come religiously expansive in the fulfillment of their obligations.329
Ten years after the Declaration, there came a vaguely affirming set
of principles. The Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (ISESCO), a unit of the OIC, delivered the Rome
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, which was ostensibly more of a
Statement of Principles33 regarding human rights, rather than an entirely
separate approach to the Declaration. The Statement of Principles,
however, did not directly endorse the Declaration. In some ways, the
Statement of Principles could be seen as a disembodied affirmation of
the Declaration, or even a retreat from the more absolutist language in
the Declaration.' It urged governments to examine "international
conventions relating to [man's] rights, compared their contents and
efficiency in dealing with human rights, and has noticed their
shortcomings in terms of meeting his growing and advanced needs ...
[and encouraged] all governments of the world and all international
bodies, organizations and institutions concerned with human rights, to
revise the international declarations and conventions on human rights in
an objective manner in order to fill the gaps therein.""33 Although it is not
entirely clear which document the Statement of Principles was directed
to inform, it reaffirmed the continued religious ratification of human
rights generally, and perhaps just as importantly, it religiously endorsed
329. One example of novel approaches to reinterpreting women's rights is the gradualist
hermeneutic in the Qur'an. "Women have fundamental freedoms within Islam, and all the
goals of equality espoused by the West can be achieved by applying the notion of gradualism
inherent in the religion. Thus, the best way to solve this problem may not lie in dictating from
the outside what standards must be met by the culture, but rather in encouraging a liberaliza-
tion of the interpretation of the religion by Islamic scholars themselves." Sayeh & Morse,
supra note 24, at 332.
330. Rome Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, in Human Rights in Islamic Teach-
ings, Annex 2, at http://www.isesco.org.ma/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2003) (report of World
Symposium on Human Rights in Islam in Rome, Feb. 27, 2000).
331. This conclusion is premised on two points. First, there was no specific mention of
the Cairo Declaration, though the Cairo Declaration itself affirmed the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Second, the specific values mentioned in the Statement of Principles, al-
though they do not retract from the Cairo Declaration, do suggest that uniformity be attempted
with regard to the panoply of human rights treaties and, at the same time, they promote recon-
ciliation among the civilizations of the world. Id.
332. Id. (emphasis added).
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the notion of a unified, rather than relative, set of human rights. The report
of the symposium, however, proffered a final and troubling comment.
"[W]e cannot, in all objectivity, set the Universal [D]eclaration [of]
Human Rights, a man-made product, to judge Islam, which is a divine
revelation.,,33 This statement suggests a continued need to further
articulate religiously valid principles, and implies that the debate
between Islamic States and international law will continue. While the
international legal arena offers broad-based hope for forcing Islamic
States to reevaluate their legal stance, the direct participation of women
will likely produce the most tangible, as well the most beneficial results
in making the standards of CEDAW a reality.
B. The Internal Dialectic: The Need for
Women's Participation in the Law
Previously, there was a heavy emphasis on the role that international
law could play in instigating changes to State practice with regard to
women's status. Prompted by the international community, many Islamic
States engaged in reforms which attempted to meet the Revivalist expec-
tations that Islamic law be implemented, while at the same time
importing the proper amount of history and circumstance to sufficiently
support a Reformist point of view. Over time, Islamic States have begun
their own, home-grown articulations of the law. However, the more diffi-
cult question is not merely how to instigate reform, but how to perfect
reform so that it will establish a semblance of permanence. The answer
to this question lies in the participation of women to best articulate their
own respective legal positions:
The majority of Muslim women who are attached to their relig-
ion will not be liberated through the use of a secular approach
imposed from the outside by international bodies or from above
by undemocratic governments. The only way to resolve the con-
flicts of these women and remove their fear of pursuing rich and
fruitful lives is to build a solid Muslim feminist jurisprudential
basis which clearly shows that Islam not only does not deprive
them of their rights, but in fact demands these rights for them.3
To repeat a maxim, there is always an implicit need to ground one's
opinions in religious belief when changing and reforming Islamic law.
A more effective strategy for establishing women's ... rights
would ground such rights within an appropriate framework that
333. Conclusion, in Human Rights in Islamic Teachings, supra note 330, at 6.
334. AI-Hibri, supra note 119, at 3.
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takes into account, not only Islam and Muslim laws, and their
varying interpretations, but also the specific cultural and political
context of any society, and is based on a bedrock of universal
human rights standards.33
As a matter of history, male jurists monopolized classical Islamic
law. Many of its principal leaders, although speaking on issues regarding
women generally, spoke only in a representational capacity and imported
their own patriarchal conditions. However, it should be noted that these
kinds of patriarchal impulses were not evident during the genesis of Is-
lamic law, especially with regard to the Sunnah. While most of the
Sunnah is obviously male centered, it did not exclude the powerful role
that early women played in the development of Islam. In dealing with
women's roles in society, often the proper course of action was found not
in the Prophet himself, who did not always deal directly in such matters,
but rather through the women closest to him, such as his wives and
daughters. The conclusion that one should come away with is that
women, in a deeply historical sense, are often in the best position to ar-
ticulate their own rights, as well as their own representational capacity.
For literally centuries, the patriarchal dominance of law not only de-
pended on male jurists to represent women's legal positions, but with
this representation also brought the likely unintended effects of imposing
one's culture. It is also likely that an abundance of time has only helped
add to the codification of these principles. Instead, Reformism of
women's status under Islam can only fully succeed if the "representa-
tive" discourse that has dominated classical Islamic law can be
overturned through an active participation of women themselves.
CONCLUSION
Islamic law is undergoing a process of reevaluation. In an era of
renewed religiosity, and in the face of modernity's perils, two factions
have emerged-the Revivalists and the Reformists. Both claim to be
faithful adherents to Islamic law; both are situated to determine the path
the law will take. The challenge to either ideology is not a simple one.
They must address modernity's political and social ills, while at the same
time justifying their particular paradigm as religiously valid. In order to
succeed in making the transition from the past to the present, Islamic law
and its followers must overcome modernity's most obstinate hurdles-the
335. Sajeda Amin & Sara Hossain, Religious and Cultural Rights: Women's Reproduc-
tive Rights and the Politics of Fundamentalism: A View from Bangladesh, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
1319, 1336 (1995).
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changes associated with the evolution of the nation-state and the changes
associated with the growth of an international legal regime. Perhaps the
greatest challenge to those advocating change is how to deal with the
religiously sensitive subject of women's rights under Islamic law, while
working within the given framework provided by international law and,
at the same time, working through the changing membrane of both
contemporary notions of the nation-state and international law.
This Note concludes where it began, asking, "What is Islamic law?"
Although I possess no definitive answers, I, like other Muslims, believe
success is often found in the struggle.
Islamic law is founded on the logic of a Principal Who guides
through instructions. Those instructions are issued to the agents
who have inherited the earth and who are bound to the Principal
by a covenant.... [T]he point of the covenant is not to live ac-
cording to the instructions, but to attempt to do so. Searching the
instructions is core value in itself-regardless of the results,
searching the instruction is a moral virtue. This is not because
the instructions are pointless, but because the instructions must
remain vibrant, dynamic, open, and relevant .... [I]t is impossi-
ble for a human being to represent God's Truth-a human being
can only represent his or her own efforts in search of this truth.
The ultimate and unwavering value in the relationship between
human beings and God is summarized in the Islamic statement,
"And, God knows best."
336




MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE
AND THEIR RESPECTIVE LEGAL SYSTEMS3 37
AFGHANISTAN: Information not available
ALBANIA: Supreme Court, chairman of the Supreme Court is elected
by the People's Assembly for a four-year term, does not accept compul-
sory ICJ jurisdiction
ALGERIA: Socialist, based on the civil law system and Islamic law; ju-
dicial review of legislative acts in ad hoc Constitutional Council composed
of various public officials, including several Supreme Court justices; does
not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
AZERBAIJAN: Based on the civil law system
BAHRAIN: Based on the common law and Islamic law
BANGLADESH: Based on the common law and Islamic law
BENIN: Based on the civil law system and customary (Islamic law)
law; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA: Constitutional Court, consists of nine mem-
bers: four members are selected by the Muslim/Croat Federation's House
of Representatives, two members by the Republika Srpska National
Assembly, and three non-Bosnian members by the President of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights
BRUNEI: Based on the common law; Islamic law supersedes certain
areas of law in a number of areas
BURKINA FAso: Based on the civil law system and Islamic law
CAMEROON: Based on the civil law system, with common law influ-
ence; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
CHAD: Based on the civil law system and Chadian customary law;
does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
COMOROS: Based on the civil law system and Islamic law in a new
consolidated code
DJIBOUTI: Based on the civil law system, traditional practices, as well
as Islamic law
EGYPT: Based on the common law, Islamic law, and Napoleonic
codes; judicial review by Supreme Court and Council of State (oversees
validity of administrative decisions); accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction,
with reservations
GABON: Based on the civil law system and customary law; judicial re-
view of legislative acts in Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court;
does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
337. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK (2001), at http://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
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GAMBIA: Based on a composite of the common law, Islamic law, and
customary law; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations
GUINEA: Based on the civil law system, customary law, and decree;
legal codes currently being revised; does not accept compulsory ICJ juris-
diction
GUINEA-BISSAU: Information not available
INDONESIA: Based on Dutch-based civil law, substantially modified by
indigenous concepts and by new criminal procedures code; does not ac-
cept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
IRAN: The Constitution codifies Shi'a version of Islamic law as the
law
IRAQ: Based on Islamic law in special religious courts, the civil law
system elsewhere; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
JORDAN: Based on the civil law system and Islamic law; judicial re-
view of legislative acts in a specially provided High Tribunal; does not
accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
KAZAKHSTAN: Based on the civil law system
KUWAIT: Civil law system with Islamic law significant in personal
matters; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
KYRGYZSTAN: Based on the civil law system
LEBANON: Mixture of Islamic law, canon law, Napoleonic code, and
civil law; no judicial review of legislative acts; does not accept compulsory
ICJ jurisdiction
LIBYA: Based on Italian-based civil law system and Islamic law; sepa-
rate religious courts; no constitutional provision for judicial review of
legislative acts; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
MALAYSIA: Based on the common law; judicial review of legislative
acts in the Supreme Court at request of supreme head of the federation;
does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
MALDIVES: Based on Islamic law with a mixture of common law, pri-
marily in commercial matters; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
MALI: Based on the civil law system and customary law; judicial re-
view of legislative acts in Constitutional Court (formally established
March 9, 1994); does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
MAURITANIA: A combination of Islamic law and modem law
MOROCCO: Based on Spanish-based civil law system and Islamic law.
MOZAMBIQUE: Based on Portuguese-based civil law system and cus-
tomary law
NIGER: Based on French civil law system and customary law; does not
accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
NIGERIA: Based on the common law, Islamic law and tribal law, pres-
ently attempting to universalize Islamic law
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OMAN: Based on the common law and Islamic law with ultimate ap-
peal to the monarch; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
PAKISTAN: Based on the common law, attempt to fully codify Islamic
law has also begun; accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations
QATAR: Discretionary system of law controlled by the emir, although
civil codes are being implemented; Islamic law is significant in personal
matters
SAUDI ARABIA: Based on Islamic law; commercial disputes handled
by special committees; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
SENEGAL: Based on the civil law system; judicial review of legislative
acts in Constitutional Court; the Council of State audits the government's
accounting office; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
SIERRA LEONE: Based on the common law and customary laws in-
digenous to local tribes; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
SOMALIA: Most regions have reverted to Islamic law with a provision
for appeal of all sentences
SUDAN: Based on the common law and Islamic law; as of January 20,
1991, the now defunct Revolutionary Command Council imposed Islamic
law in the northern states; Islamic law applies to all residents of the north-
ern states regardless of their religion; some separate religious courts;
accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations
SURINAME: Based on Dutch legal system incorporating French penal
theory
SYRIA: Based on the civil law system and Islamic law; special reli-
gious courts; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
TAJIKISTAN: Based on the civil law system; no judicial review of legis-
lative acts
TURKEY: Derived from various European continental legal systems;
accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, with reservations
TURKMENISTAN: Based on the civil law system
TUNISIA: Based on the civil law system and Islamic law.
UGANDA: In 1995, the government restored the legal system to one
based on the common law and customary law; accepts compulsory ICJ
jurisdiction, with reservations
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: All emirates have secular and Islamic law
for civil, criminal matters.
UZBEKISTAN: Evolution of Soviet civil law; still lacks independent
judicial system
YEMEN: Based on Islamic law, Turkish law, the common law, and lo-
cal tribal customary law; does not accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction
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